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ABSTRACT**
In the past ten years, Congress passed three major reform acts to
address two diametrically opposed concerns: It first restrained what it
believed was an excess of securities fraud litigation, then responded to an
explosion of securities fraud. This Article contends that despite the
competing provocations and ambitions of the reforms, they share an
unwarranted adherence to the principle of disclosure as the best means to
attack market malfeasance: The Article examines the basis for and
consequences of that undeserved legislative fidelity. Applying behavioral
economics and cultural theory to the recent legislation and its
underpinnings, the Article concludes that a resilient faith in the integrity and
possibilities of markets has displaced critical examination of market
practices. Because Congress resists the more complex and irregular
descriptions of markets that behavioral economists provide and instead
relies ever more heavily on disclosure, legal models remain far too simple
to capture much real world behavior – including the many possible
permutations of fraud. This misplaced faith in the preventive power of
disclosure impedes efforts to deter, detect and punish securities
malfeasance. This Article suggests an alternative. Drawing on skeptical
philosophy, it proposes a conceptual framework and practical reforms that
avoid extremes and accommodate change. The skeptical approach
advocated here acknowledges the benefits of disclosure, but contends that
securities regulations also must recognize its limitations. The Article
suggests that by questioning its assumptions, broadening its approach, and
redirecting its resources toward a more diverse range of regulatory
mechanisms, Congress could craft securities regulations that recognize the
market’s imperfections and better protect its participants from fraud.

**

This Article is approximately 27,500 words long, including footnotes.
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Fighting Fraud on Faith:
Federal Securities Regulation and the Limits of Disclosure
Every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the
society as great as he can. . . . He intends only his own gain, and he is in
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of his intention. . . . By pursuing his own interest he
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really
intends to promote it.
Adam Smith
Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.
The Epistle of Paul, 11:1
In his recent book, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz
describes the federal government’s economic decision-making as an
exercise of faith – “faith in words, in mystical notions of confidence, in the
so-called wisdom of the financial markets.”1 He explains that although
“everyone” involved in certain major decisions recognized that key
assumptions about market behavior were unrealistic “there was a hope . . .
that if the real world did not depart too much from such assumptions . . .
Adam Smith’s invisible hand theory would still provide a good description
of the economy.”2 This, Stiglitz warns, “was a hope based more on faith –
especially by those whom it served well – than on science.”3
Faith in the “wisdom of the financial markets” is not merely a figure
of speech, but a meaningful description of a frequent basis for federal

1

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES 151 (2003).
Id.
3
Id.
2
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As Stiglitz intimates, traditional economic

explanations are no longer accurate descriptions of the way financial
markets function. Economists and behavioral psychologists have rejected
traditional models of market behavior, having found that “[w]hile [they]
have their place as illustrations of characterizations of an ideal world, we
cannot maintain them in their pure form as accurate descriptors of actual
markets.”4

Instead, behavioral economics cautions that “we have to

distance ourselves from the presumption that financial markets always work
well and that price changes always reflect genuine information.”5
Legislative reforms have failed to adapt to this altered assessment, however.
While they appear to acknowledge, assess, and respond to instances of
actual or purported market failure, the enacted reforms manifest a continued
faith in presumptions of questionable validity.
This Article argues that trust in traditional assumptions regarding the
prophylactic powers of information distribution continues to constrain
government efforts to guard the integrity of the financial markets.

It

contends that although Congress attempts to respond to real or alleged
market breakdowns, its adherence to suspect models prevents it from
adequately understanding or responding to those malfunctions. Because
they resist the more complex and irregular descriptions of markets that
4

Robert Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 83, 103 (2003) (discussing the efficient market hypothesis in particular).
5
Id.

4

Fighting Fraud on Faith

September 5, 2005

behavioral economists provide, legal models remain far too simple to
capture much real world behavior – including the many possible
permutations of fraud.

Legislative reforms instead tend to affirm the

integrity and legitimacy of markets with an insistence that resonates as
faith: as the substance of things hoped for, but not seen. This Article
suggests that by reasserting without reconsidering the integrity of the
market, Congress misses opportunities to deter fraud and in fact may enact
regulations poorly tailored to enhance market monitoring.

Drawing on

economic and cultural theory to examine securities regulation and litigation,
the Article proposes that faith in markets has tainted law’s responses to
claims of securities fraud. It argues that congressional resistance to claims
that the securities markets are incompletely efficient and consistently
susceptible to fraud stems from entrenched belief, not from open evaluation
of the validity of these challenges and, as a result, tends to err too much
towards deference to and defense of market self-policing.
While it is necessary and appropriate for courts and Congress to
limit nuisance suits and to regulate malfeasance, when monitors’ responses
rest on faith, they tend to rely too much on disclosure to prevent damages ex
ante and too little on enforcement6 to discover and compensate for them ex
poste.

Instead of designing a framework that encourages meritorious

6

For ease of reference, I will use the term “enforcement” to refer to all forms of litigation –
including SEC enforcement actions, state and federal criminal prosecutions and civil
litigation.
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litigation to play a monitoring and deterrence role, faith in markets has
induced over-reliance on disclosure to deter and expose wrong-doing. Even
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,7 which purported to respond to the massive
financial frauds of the boom years by dramatically increasing measures
designed to ensure market integrity, reflects this unwarranted faith. This
Article proposes that Congress should replace faith with skepticism and be
more willing to consider means of supplementing disclosure through
increased enforcement and appropriately tailored regulation.
Although other commentators have examined the salutary role
confidence plays in stabilizing and maintaining markets,8 none have
examined the dangers to markets of fundamentalist faith per se.

This

Article’s contribution to the literature on securities regulation is unique: It
contends that although recent major securities reforms purport to address
diametrically opposed concerns – an excess of securities fraud litigation on
the one hand,9 and on the other an explosion of securities fraud10 – they rely

7

Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Sen. Comm.
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 107-205, 107th Cong. 2d. Sess. 2
(2002).
8
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State
in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 64-65 (2001); Troy A.
Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Law
Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM & MARY L. REVIEW 1055, 1144 (2004); Lawrence M. Ausubel,
Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1022, 1023
(1990); and Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: an Economic Analysis of
Stockmarket Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 668-74 (1988).
9
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,
and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227.
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on common (and faulty) theoretical assumptions.

Despite the different

provocations and ambitions of each of the reform efforts, this Article argues
that they share an unwarranted adherence to, and place an undeserved
emphasis upon, disclosure as the means to attack market malfeasance.
While other commentators have examined the disclosure principle as a
foundation for securities regulation,11 none have offered a cohesive critique
of its role in contemporary efforts to address market malfeasance. This
Article goes beyond the behavioral law and economics critiques of the legal
principles,12 to examine the way lawmakers’ faith in those principles has
affected their legislation.

It suggests that in the wake of mounting

challenges to received views, a resurgence of reverence for markets has
prompted reflexive and poorly tailored legislation that is unduly hostile to
adjudication. Applying behavioral economics and cultural studies to recent
securities reform acts, it provides a theoretical analysis rooted in detailed
examination of specific regulatory and litigation strategies. In particular, it
elucidates the practical consequences for markets, courts, and litigants of
rooting financial market regulation in faith, rather than skepticism.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by introducing the
theoretical assumptions underlying the disclosure model of federal

10

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act of 2002.
11
Discussed infra at __.
12
Discussed infra at __.
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Disclosure – the voluntary or mandatory

dissemination of information into the public realm – is purported to be the
“disinfectant” that will purge the markets of malfeasance.13 Disclosure is
the primary defense against market malfeasance: It is to ensure that all
material information is available to all, and information in turn ensures
rational bargaining and accurate valuation.

As the Supreme Court

describes it, because “the darkness and ignorance of commercial secrecy are
the conditions upon which predatory practices best thrive,” disclosure has
long been considered the best antidote for fraud.14 Part I.A. explores these
concepts and provides an overview of the traditional legal and economic
theory of the disclosure approach to market monitoring. As the securities
laws reflect, in a disclosure regime, actors are posited to be not only selfinterested, but also fully informed and rational. Since rational investors
operate with access to all public information, they naturally will tend to
negotiate prices that accurately reflect the asset’s fundamental worth. The
combination of rational actors and complete information creates a market
system in which assets are accurately valued and efficiently exchanged. On
this theory, regulation is rarely needed: If the material information is
disclosed, the market will do the rest.
13

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (“[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman.”) (citation omitted).
14
Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 200
(1972).
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The efficient market and rational investor theories used to justify
limited market monitoring have come under fire from innovative work in
behavioral economics, however. Part I.B outlines the behavioral critique of
the traditional assumptions. As Part I.B recounts, behavioral economists
have challenged the basic underpinnings of the traditional model by
examining the decision-making process and correlation vel non among
price, value, and information. Their criticism of the economic model in turn
has prompted legal academic questioning of the adequacy of securities
regulations. If disclosure does not function as expected – if it does not
disinfect because investors are not rational or markets are not efficient –
then more regulation or more stringent enforcement of current rules may be
needed to ensure market integrity.

If the market and investors do not

behave as assumed, they may not be as well-suited to police themselves.
Despite the behavioralists’ questioning of the laws’ premises, the
assumptions that markets are in general resistant to fraud remain firmly
entrenched in legislative approaches to monitoring malfeasance. Part I.C
provides the theoretical and cultural explanation for this legislative fidelity.
Drawing on recent works of cultural theory, it examines the powerful
reverence for markets that came to dominance in the nineteen-nineties. It
explores how exaltation of financial markets displaced critical examination

9
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of market practices – how faith in the integrity and possibilities of markets
became the common anthem for market observers.
Part II elucidates how Congressional securities reform legislation
incorporates that cultural leitmotif. Part II demonstrates that Congress’s
resistance to litigation can be explained in terms of misplaced faith in the
preventive power of disclosure, and examines the consequences of that
faith.

Part II divides this analysis in decreasing order of particularity;

ranging from the theoretical underpinnings through the regulatory
framework to the concrete details of the In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities
Litigation. At each level, the analysis reveals that the general theoretical
trends and the individual consequences have been shaped by faith at the
expense of market participants.

Part II.A turns in detail to the legal

framework established by congressional legislation. Analyzing lawmakers’
responses in terms of faith, it identifies constraint of civil litigation and
distrust of private litigants as resonating themes. The securities reform acts
of 1995 and 1998 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 reflect an insistence
on the primacy of disclosure that produced oscillating antagonism towards
plaintiffs and possible corporate wrong-doers.

By fluctuating between

vigorous condemnation of plaintiffs and of corporations, between
encouraging

and

discouraging

lawsuits,

and

between

extensively

monitoring and trusting market participants, laws’ responses have created
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uncertainty for litigants and for the subjects of regulation. While Congress
consistently claims that it is responding to uniquely egregious conduct on
the part of plaintiffs and corporate wrong-doers, its own fealty to illfounded principles may in part be responsible for creating the conditions
that give rise to the conduct it condemns. In addition to producing underand over-regulation, the propensity for dramatic change encourages each
side to lobby for frequent reform. Part II.A suggests that without a stable
framework of expectation, securities monitoring is in danger of being
distracted from the merits of particular claims in favor of broader defenses
or condemnations of the background conditions. It contends that while
some reforms strike an appropriately moderate tone, too often Congress
responds disproportionately to the heresy of litigants and the betrayals of
market malfeasors.

As a result, reforms paradoxically produce both

uncertainty and an undeserved confidence in the integrity and fairness of the
market.
Having considered the reform acts in detail in Part II.A., Part II.B
turns to their consequences for litigants. Part II.B employs a detailed study
of the plaintiffs’ strategies in the WorldCom securities litigation to identify
precise ways in which legislative antagonism to litigation can backfire.
Securities reforms designed to constrain frivolous litigation can create
procedural conundrums that have the potential to drain resources from the
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merits of a case. As the WorldCom action reveals, plaintiffs who choose to
do so can exploit the new reforms to advance their own interests at the
expense of other wronged shareholders.

By enacting legislation that

responded to particular law firms and their strategies, rather than legislation
that offered a clear, systemic vision of how to focus litigation on the merits
of claims, Congress may have preserved plaintiffs’ ability to bring
exploitative litigation while missing an opportunity to encourage
meritorious private monitoring of corporate malfeasance.
Having proposed in Part II that pervasive, dogmatic faith in the
integrity and efficiency of the securities markets has produced undesirable
trends in securities regulation, Part III turns to possible solutions. It draws
on skeptical philosophy to suggest that market integrity would be better
served by a regulatory approach that more thoroughly acknowledges – and
even embraces – the uncertainty and challenges that it faces. While “in a
time of faith” skepticism may be “the most intolerable of insults,”15 the
skepticism proposed here is skepticism in the service of faith. Skepticism
advises that true understanding (and thus decision-making) can come only
by acknowledging the impossibility of complete understanding. Following
Montaigne’s skepticism and Emerson’s description of it, Part III argues that
“since true fortitude of understanding consists in not letting what we know

15

Randolph Bourne, The War and the Intellectuals, SEVEN ARTS (1917).
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be embarrassed by what we do not know, we ought to secure those
advantages which we can command, and not risk them by clutching after
the airy and unattainable.”16 Perfectly efficient markets and wholly rational
investors are unattainable, and behavioral law and economics has opened up
a realm of uncertainty regarding market behavior. At the same time, within
the existing legal framework plaintiffs often contest the legitimacy of
market behavior through civil litigation. Rather than resist either challenge
with reflexive reliance on discounted assumptions, courts and regulators
ought to acknowledge the fragility of their assumptions and address the
critiques on their merits.

Remedying the procedural and jurisdictional

intricacies created by the 1990s reforms in favor of procedural rules that
more cohesively favor federal courts and consolidated litigation would be
one such step. Acknowledging the limits of disclosure might also require
renewed consideration of substantive regulations designed to protect
investors who behavioral economics shows are unable to protect
themselves. Exchanging fundamentalist faith for engaged skepticism in this
fashion can shape markets that resist fraud and deserve confidence.
Describing

Montaigne’s

skepticism,

Emerson

explains

that

“[s]kepticism is the attitude assumed by the student in relation to the
particulars which society adores, but which he sees to be reverend only in
16

Ralph Waldo Emerson, Montaigne; Or, The Skeptic, RALPH WALDO EMERSON, 312, 316
(Richard Poirier ed., 1990) (1850).
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The ground occupied by the skeptic is the

vestibule of the temple.” The skeptical approach offered here is one that
contends that reverence for the spirit of efficient and fair markets is indeed
desirable, but should be earned through works – questioning, reforming,
regulating, litigating – not through “faith in words” or “mystical notions of
confidence” alone.
I. The Theoretical Assumptions Underlying Securities Regulation
A. The Disclosure Principle
Federal securities regulation and litigation in the United States stand
on a firm belief in the principle of disclosure.

Since the first federal

securities laws of the 1930s, the goal of federal financial market regulation
has been to remedy information asymmetries, and the system of mandatory
disclosure has been the primary means of achieving it.17 Information – the
constant, detailed, constrained, monitored, accumulated flow of information
– in all its forms serves as the first line of defense against market
malfeasance and the principal guarantor of the capital market regime.
Regulations crafted by Congress and the SEC mandate and order the type,

17

Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving
Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 650 (1995). The
conviction that disclosing information about securities and their issuers ensures the fair and
efficient flow of capital is also the central premise of the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s approach to securities regulation. ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND
CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE 37 (1992). Like SEC
enforcement actions, criminal prosecutions and private litigation frequently center on
violations of disclosure obligations, claiming either that the disclosures were insufficient or
that they were materially misleading.
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form, and extent of issuers’ disclosures.18

The reliance on public

dissemination of information to ensure the integrity of the securities
markets is evident not only in the initial choice to enact a disclosure rather
than merit-based regime of federal regulation, but also in the recent
modifications of the securities laws.

Increasingly, antifraud securities

reforms have replaced a system in which disclosure serves as the baseline
principle but litigation serves to enforce compliance with a regulatory
framework that relies more exclusively on disclosure. This Section
examines this orientation toward disclosure by providing a brief overview
of its inception in the first two major federal securities laws.
The federal government was slow to enter the field of securities
regulation.

Until the New Deal, the states governed the exchange of

securities through a patchwork of so-called “blue sky” laws.19 The state
statutes established comprehensive licensing schemes,20 and focused on the
“merits” of the proffered security by authorizing administrative authorities
to prevent the offering of a security deemed to be “unfair, unjust,

18

Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act, firms that satisfy the governing criteria must
file annual, quarterly, and sometimes monthly, reports. In addition to the disclosures
mandated by law, issuers may also disclose information voluntarily – as when they seek to
alert investors to their rising fortunes, projected earnings, or coming difficulties. The “safeharbor” provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 increased
protection for companies disclosing forward-looking information. Those provisions and
the disclosure requirements are discussed infra at ___.
19
Michael A. Perino, Fraud & Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 280 (1998).
20
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 44 (rev. ed. 1995) (citation
omitted); see also id.
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inequitable, or oppressive.”21 With the stock market collapse of 1929 and
subsequent Great Depression, demand for federal market regulation
prompted congressional action.22 The first federal law governing securities
markets, the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act” or “1933 Act”),
was part of the flood of legislation enacted during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
first hundred days.23

Since it was enacted so swiftly, there is limited

legislative history to reveal the theory behind this major law; nonetheless,
the Act and its interpretation reveal its orientation and intent.
The Securities Act of 1933 imposed registration and disclosure
obligations on companies offering securities for sale to the public. Its
disclosure philosophy followed the English Companies Act24 while its
antifraud provisions derived from the Martin Act of New York State.25 As
the Supreme Court has observed, the 1933 Act “was designed to provide
21

Act of Mar. 10, 1911, ch. 133, 1911 Kan Sess. Laws 210, 212, repealed by Act of Mar.
16, 1929, ch. 140, 1929 Kan. Sess. Laws. 212 quoted in Seligman, supra n.__, at 673.
22
See Seligman, supra n.__, at 673-75.
23
JOSEPH P. LASH, DEALERS & DREAMERS 131 (1988).
24
See id.
25
See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra n.__ at 180. Although the role of the Martin Act in
policing securities markets is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that due to
the efforts of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, the more senior Act recently has
regained a prominent role in securities regulation and market reform. See Raymond
Hennessy, Spitzer Uses Old State Law to Target Insurers, Oct. 19, 2004, WALL ST. J. at
C1; Dennis C. Vacco, Martin Act Martinet, April 12, 2004, WALL ST. J. at A18; Tom
Lauricella, Fund Industry Faces Overhaul as Spitzer, SEC Fight for Turf, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 31, 2003, at A1; Riva D. Atlas, SEC Chief Plays Down Clash with State Attorneys
General, NY TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at C2; Jerry Markon, Obscure State Law Puts Heat on
Executives, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at C1; James Traub, Eliot Spitzer Goes to War, NY
TIMES, June 16, 2002, at Sec. 6. The Martin Act has also played a significant role in
criminal prosecution of high-profile white collar defendants. Former Tyco CEO Dennis
Kozlowski, for example, was convicted in New York State court of charges arising under
the Martin Act.
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investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public
offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud, and,
through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical
standards of honesty and fair dealing.”26

The 1933 Act established

obligations in connection with the initial registration and offering of a
security to the public and focuses on the responsibilities of issuers and those
who aid them in this initial offering phase.27 It requires issuers of securities
to file a registration statement when they distribute securities to the public28
and governs the form and content of statements and behavior related to the
initial offering.
The following year, Congress addressed the need to regulate the
secondary market for securities. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act” or “1934 Act”) imposes ongoing disclosure obligations
affecting the secondary market.29 Like the 1933 Act, the Exchange Act
responded to concerns emerging from the Depression and, like the earlier
Act, it chose obligatory disclosures and accurate information as the best
means to ensure the integrity of the securities markets. Where the 1933 Act
is designed to address information asymmetries at the time of initial
26

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
Compared to the Exchange Act, the Securities Act has been relatively unaffected by the
recent reforms. Its strict liability, negligence and SEC enforcement provisions remain
potent tools in efforts to fight securities malfeasance.
28
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
29
The obligation to file quarterly and annual reports (Forms 10-Q and 10-K), for example,
arises pursuant to the 1934 Act.
27

17

Fighting Fraud on Faith

September 5, 2005

offering, the 1934 Act imposes continuous disclosure obligations to prevent
such asymmetries from reemerging in the secondary market. The SEC, the
Department of Justice, and private litigants have all played significant roles
in enforcing the provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts through
investigation, prosecution, and/or litigation.30
The two New Deal Acts, and with them the emphasis on disclosure,
have dominated the federal securities regulation regime since their
inception.31 The disclosure regime Congress adopted rests on two key

30

In securities fraud litigation, the most well-known provision of the 1934 Act is Section
10(b), the general antifraud provision, which in turn gave rise to the private cause of action
for securities fraud created by Rule 10b-5.
31
The securities markets are governed by a handful federal laws: The Securities Act, the
Exchange Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79, the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-1, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1, the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The
Securities Act and the Exchange Act remain the most significant, however, not only in their
initial premises, but as they have evolved. Over the years the Acts have been streamlined–
of particular relevance for purposes of this Article, by shifting toward integrated disclosure.
As it became evident that the 1933 and 1934 Act requirements involved substantial
duplication of information and compliance costs, the SEC embarked on an effort to
integrate the disclosure requirements of the two Acts. See Circumstances Affecting the
Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable Investigation & Reasonable Grounds for
Belief Under Section 11 of the Securities Act, SEC Release No. 6335, 1981 WL 31062, at
*1 (Aug. 6, 1981) (“SEC Release No. 6335”); Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision to
System for Registration of Securities Offerings, SEC Release No. 6331, 1981 WL 30765, at
*2 (Aug. 6, 1981) (“SEC Release No. 6331”). The integration effort proceeded “primarily
by incorporating by reference Exchange Act reports into Securities Act registration
statements.” SEC Release No. 6335, at *3. Incorporation was implemented through the
shortened registration Form S-3, which requires incorporation by reference of a registrant’s
Form 10-K from the previously concluded fiscal year and all interim Exchange Act filings
from the end of that year through the end of the offering period. This “short-form
registration” is for use by companies who have substantial equity floats or rated debt
securities and are widely followed by professional analysts. See Shelf Registration, SEC
Release No. 6499, 1983 WL 408321, at *2 (Nov. 17, 1983). Integrated disclosure was
intended to “simplify disclosure and reduce unnecessary repetition and redelivery of
information,” not to modify the obligations imposed by the securities Acts themselves. See
SEC Release 6335, *10 (discussing Rule 176 due diligence obligations). Integrated
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assumptions regarding the nature of the interaction between markets and
investors. First, it assumes that investors access, assess, and adapt to the
information disclosed. In effect, the disclosure regime holds that informed
investors are their own best defense against bad deals and flawed choices.32
It says: Supply investors with the information they require, trust them to
evaluate that information, and allow them to choose the path that best suits
their needs. In order to conceive of investors in this mold, however, one
must first assume that all (or most) investors have equal access, to complete
information, which they rationally and thoroughly process to come to
accurate conclusions. The adjectives are key to the theory: If investors truly
are to be their own best defense, they must be assumed to function at a quite
sophisticated level.
Second, the disclosure regime hypothesizes a thoroughly efficient
market. The efficient market hypothesis (“EMH”) “asserts that all financial
prices accurately reflect all public information at all times.”33 Thus an
efficient market is a market in which assets are correctly priced given

disclosure operates on the assumption that once information has been disclosed, it need not
be repeated – the market will absorb it initially and alter accordingly. Indeed, the
integration of the two Acts again made explicit that the federal approach to securities
regulation rests firmly on a belief in the efficacy of disclosure.
32
KHADEMIAN, supra n.__, at 29.
33
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 171 (2000). Eugene Fama has been a
leading advocate of this position. See Eugene Fama, Market Efficiency, Long Term
Returns and Behavioral Finance, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1998); Eugene Fama, Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
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publicly available information.34 The EMH’s model of market assessments
draws from the presumed ability of investors to process information
quickly, rationally, and accurately when deciding the price of their
transactions. On the EMH, the price at which the market arrives reflects the
assets’ fundamentals – that is, it optimally predicts the present value of the
entitlement to future benefits that is conferred by current ownership of the
share.35 According to the efficient market hypothesis, asset price changes
are unpredictable because they occur only when truly new information
enters the public sphere. This effect is described as the “random walk”
theory: because the new information is unknown and impossible to
anticipate, it produces a price movement the size and direction of which
cannot be predicted with any accuracy.36 Since the price in an efficient
market either reflects all publicly available information or responds without
warning to the disclosure of new information, efficient markets are also
assumed to be equal-opportunity markets. That is, no matter how “smart”
an investor is, on the EMH she cannot beat the Street.37
The two fundamental assumptions together place a great deal of
faith in the evaluative capacity of individual decision makers and collective
action.

They trust that when given enough material and accurate

34

SHILLER, id. at 171; Fama, 25 J. FIN. at 383.
PAUL ORMEROD, BUTTERFLY ECONOMICS 15 (2000).
36
SHILLER , supra n.__, at 171.
37
Shiller describes this assumption in terms of the equal results obtained by investors of
differing aptitudes. Id. at 173.
35
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information, investors individually and collectively can assess value, predict
trends, and distinguish honesty from chicanery. The law in turn places its
faith in these fundamental assumptions. By emphasizing disclosure as the
primary means of ensuring market integrity, the law trusts that individuals
will act according to the rational investor model to produce efficient
markets. Federal rules require the disclosure of information prior to and at
the time of a purchase or sale based on the belief that such disclosure will
help to ensure that the assets are accurately valued and that investors are not
penalized by information asymmetries.
When transactions “go wrong” and a displeased purchaser or seller
pursues civil litigation, the legal standards reflect this underlying regulatory
theory. In securities fraud litigation, market participants and background
conditions are assumed to conform more or less to the theoretical rational
investor and efficient market. Although securities enforcement litigation
relies on the same models disclosure does, unlike the disclosure
requirements it necessarily approaches the assumptions with skepticism, not
faith. Where disclosure must trust that the dissemination of information
will proceed according to the theoretical model, litigants must prove how a
particular transaction transpired. The legal standard and adversary process
preclude unquestioning adherence to a given hypothesis – where disclosure
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rules can rest on unconfirmed assumptions, litigated claims must be
properly alleged and proven.
The different role the economic assumptions play in securities
litigation can be seen in an examination of a typical Section 10(b) claim.
Plaintiffs in a typical Section 10(b) securities fraud claim must prove “(a) a
material misrepresentation (or omission), (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state
of mind, (3) a connection with the purchase of sale of a security, (4)
reliance, often referred to in cases involving public securities markets . . . as
“transaction causation,” (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation, i.e., a
causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.”38
Each element reflects the presence of the underlying economic assumptions,
assumptions that will be scrutinized during litigation.

For example, a

“material” statement is one that a reasonable person would consider
important when deciding whether to buy or sell securities.39 To assess the
materiality of a statement or omission, a court must determine whether
“defendants’ representations or omissions, considered together and in
context, would affect the total mix of information and thereby mislead a

38

Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1631 (2005) (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original). See also Lawrence v. Cohn, 325 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (plaintiffs must
show that “the defendant, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, made a
materially false statement or omitted a material fact, with scienter, and that plaintiff’s
reliance on defendant’s action caused injury to the plaintiff.”). This representative standard
discussed below is that of the Second Circuit, which tends to impose greater burdens on
plaintiffs than other Circuits.
39
Halperin v. eBankerUSA.com, Inc., 295 F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 2002).
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reasonable investor regarding the nature of the securities offered.”40 The
securities fraud standard thus reflects the EMH belief that investors’
decisions are based primarily on the “total mix” of information available in
the marketplace.
Courts also must determine the likely effect on investors of
cautionary language included in the total mix of information.41 Under the
“bespeaks caution” doctrine, misrepresentations are immaterial as a matter
of law if “it cannot be said that any reasonable investor could consider them
important in light of adequate cautionary language set out in the same”
document.42

As with materiality, cautionary language is assessed in a

specific factual context. The court is to consider “the allegedly fraudulent
materials in their entirety to determine whether a reasonable investor would
have been misled. The touchstone of the inquiry is not whether isolated
statements within a document were true, but whether defendants'
representations or omissions, considered together and in context, would
affect the total mix of information and thereby mislead a reasonable
investor regarding the nature of the securities offered.”43

Again, the

bespeaks caution doctrine assumes investors will discern and rationally
respond to cautionary language.
40

Id.; see also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
Halperin, 295 F.3d at 357.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 356.
41
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Plaintiffs also must establish both transaction and loss causation.
As the Supreme Court affirmed last term, Congress has made clear its
“intent to permit private securities fraud actions for recovery where, but
only where, plaintiffs adequately allege and prove the traditional elements
of causation and loss.”44 The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit
standard that had permitted plaintiffs to recover even when they had only
established that “the price on the date of purchase was inflated because of
the misrepresentation.”45 In so holding, the Supreme Court reiterated the
importance of proof in securities law cases: It noted that the securities
statutes seek to maintain confidence in the markets by deterring fraud “in
part through the availability of private securities fraud actions.”46 But it
also cautioned that “the statutes make these [] actions available, not to
provide investors with broad insurance against market losses, but to protect
them against those economic losses that misrepresentations actually
cause.”47

Plaintiffs may not rely on theoretical models – they must

established the extent and cause of their losses in concrete terms.

In

addition to loss causation, plaintiffs must prove transaction causation or
reliance. The Second Circuit has explained that a plaintiff must allege that
“but for the fraudulent statement or omission, the plaintiff would not have

44

Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (2005).
Id. at 1631 (quoting the Ninth Circuit standard).
46
Id. at 1633.
47
Id.
45
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entered into the transaction” and that “the subject of the fraudulent
statement or omission was the cause of the actual loss suffered.”48
However, since direct reliance is extremely difficult to establish in the
complex modern markets, at the pleading stage plaintiffs may rely on the
“fraud-on-the-market” theory. Under this federal doctrine, they do not need
to allege that they actually encountered the misrepresentation – instead, the
court is to presume that plaintiffs relied on the market to “perform a
substantial part of the valuation process performed by the investor in a faceto-face

transaction.”49

The

fraud-on-the-market

theory

explicitly

incorporates the efficient market hypothesis: it assumes that “[t]he market is
acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the
information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market
price.”50 Like the disclosure principle, therefore, at the pleading stage the
legal presumptions trust in the accuracy of the economic theory. Unlike
legislators crafting a disclosure rule, however, plaintiffs must earn the
court’s trust by proving the accuracy of the theory in each case.
As this overview shows, before, during, and after securities
transactions, the relationships among the participants are governed by rules
that assume the existence of the two key background conditions – rational

48

Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (citation omitted).
50
Id.
49
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How those assumptions are treated,

however, drastically differs depending on the legal forum in which they are
approached. When securities regulations are based on rational investor
models and EMH, they trust in the accuracy of those descriptions –
disclosure assumes that dissemination of accurate, material information
ensures fair markets because it assumes that the information will be
processed and used in conformity with economic theory. In enforcement
litigation, the faith in rational investors and efficient markets must be
earned by the concrete work of investigation, adjudication, and resolution.
A balanced approach has faith that markets work well most of the time, but
is not so trusting that it disdains the possibility that the models will fail.
Enforcement catches those failures, providing an additional level of
deterrence and protection for individual investors and for the markets as a
whole. As the federal approach erodes enforcement mechanisms in favor of
increasing dependence solely on disclosure, however, it becomes a system
based ever more deeply on faith alone.
While the legal regime continues to stand on the assumptions that
investors are rational and markets are efficient, economic theory has
stepped away from them. Although many economists still strongly support
the efficient market theory and continue to rebut its challengers, the
efficient market theory and belief in investor rationality have been subjected
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to extensive scrutiny and criticism.

The next section explores that

economic theory to suggest that the law rests on a faulty foundation.
B. Questioning Assumptions About Markets: Behavioral Economics
Economists using innovative and interdisciplinary approaches have
become increasingly convinced that orthodox economic theory cannot
adequately explain market and investor behavior.51

They challenge

standard economic views regarding each of the above assumptions:
Investors, they contend, are influenced by many factors and markets are
rarely efficient. Offering a holistic criticism (although not a coherent
alternative model), economists have identified critical irrationalities and
inefficiencies in market and investor behavior.

Indeed, while some

economists continue to defend traditional approaches, contemporary
economic theory largely rejects the models discussed thus far. Harvard
President and former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has even
claimed that “[t]he efficient market hypothesis is the most remarkable error
in the history of economic theory.”52

51

The work in behavioral economics draws heavily on psychologists’ insights into human
decision-making and evaluative capabilities. The full breadth of this interdisciplinary
project is beyond the scope of this Article, however. This Section will focus on the
economic application of these insights. For a cohesive analysis of the diverse literature in
this area, see ROBERT E. LANE, THE MARKET EXPERIENCE (1991).
52
Quoted in ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONGTERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 74 (2000). Although Arrow’s theorem provided remarkable
guidance for many years, it appears to apply only in exceptionally rare circumstances. A
glimpse of the effect of Arrow’s work can be found in the papers collected in LANDMARK
PAPERS IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY, SOCIAL CHOICE & WELFARE (selected by
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As Paul Ormerod states, “orthodox economics cannot account for
the sheer volatility of asset markets, and the paradoxes which arise” in
market behavior.53 Stock markets are simply far more volatile than efficient
markets theory would imply.54

Once economists allow for interaction

between investors and for positive feedback, they generate models “in
complete contradiction to the predictions of orthodox economic theory.”55
Behavioral models demonstrate that investors’ decisions are influenced not
only by market price and publicly available information, but also by their
individual psychology and their interactions with others. Yale economist
Robert Shiller describes these “amplification mechanisms” and “feedback

Kenneth Arrow & Gérard Debreu) (2001) and in ARROW AND THE ASCENT OF MODERN
ECONOMIC THEORY (George R. Feiwel ed., 1987).
53
ORMEROD, supra n.__, at 19.
54
See John Y. Campbell, A Variance Decomposition for Stock Returns, 101 ECON. J. 157
(1991); John Y. Campbell & Robert Shiller, Stock Prices, Earnings and Expected
Dividends, 43 J. FIN. 661 (July 1988); Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much
to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 420 (June 1981);
Stephen F. LeRoy & Richard D. Porter, The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on
Implied Variance Bounds, 49 ECONOMETRICA 97 (May 1981). While recent research
emphasizes that “the aggregate stock market appears to be wildly inefficient,” it also
emphasizes that individual stock prices may show some correspondence to efficient
markets theory. Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 83, 88 (2003).
55
ORMEROD, id. n.__ at 23. Robert Shiller was one of the earliest and remains one of the
leading proponents of this work. See SHILLER at 148; Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient
Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 83 (Winter 2003);
Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes
in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 420 (June 1981); Robert J. Shiller, Bubbles, Human
Judgment & Expert Opinion, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1303 (May 2001),
available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu (last visited July 10, 2005). See also HERSH
SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000); PAUL ORMEROD, THE DEATH OF
ECONOMICS (1994); RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS &
PSYCHOLOGY, Princeton Conference on Behavioral Economics, report on the conference
(Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder, eds.) (Oct. 1984).
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loops” as a “type of naturally occurring Ponzi process.”56 Typical investors,
Shiller notes, do not normally behave like the ideal investors of traditional
economic or legal models.57 Instead, their emotional state and interactions
with others are just as likely to influence their economic behavior as are
“hard” factors like those posited by traditional theories.58 In addition to
these influences, investor behavior is determined in part by the fact that
people may hold contradictory views simultaneously and may not be
definitively attached to many of their views.59 Because their commitments
are weak, multiple, and often in tension with each other, investors do not
make decisions based on a rational calculus.60 They are human, and apt to
be swayed by emotional and societal factors. Although the EMH has not

56

SHILLER, supra n.__, at 44.
Id. at 55.
58
See Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 3 LEGAL THEORY
105 (1997); Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic and Daniel Kahneman, The Causes of Preference
Reversal, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 204 (1990); Roman Frydman, Towards an Understanding of
Market Processes: Individual Expectations, Learning, and Convergence to Rational
Expectations Equilibrium, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 652 (Sept. 1982) (discussing the importance
of social norms in individual decision-making and impediments to the formation of rational
expectations).
59
See, e.g., Robert P. Abelson, Social Psychology’s Rational Man, in RATIONALITY AND
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (S.I. Benn & B.W. Mortimore, eds.) (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1976) (discussing bounded rationality and process of “satisficing”); D.J. Butler, Do
Non-Expected Utility Choice Patterns Spring From Hazy Preferences? An Experimental
Study of Choice ‘Errors,’ 41 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 277 (2000); Yaw Nyarko,
Michael Woodford, & Nicholas C. Yannelis, Bounded Rationality and Learning, 4 ECON.
THEORY 811 (1994) (introducing symposium papers on sophistication and beliefs of
decision-makers).
60
See SHILLER, supra n.__, at 153, 57; see also Stephen J. Humphrey, FeedbackConditional Regret Theory and Testing Regret-Aversion in Risky Choice, 25 J. ECON.
PSYCH. 839 (2004) (discussing the role of expected rejoicing and regret in the decisionmaking process).
57
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yet been completely supplanted, the behavioral finance critique is widely
accepted in the economic literature.
Just as economists challenged the dominance of the efficient market
theory, legal scholars have used behavioral economics to assess the laws
that govern market activity. “Behavioral law and economics” scholars have
applied the conclusions and the methodology of behavioral economics to
identify inadequacies in the legal regime and to argue that legal approaches
to market governance should adapt more complex (and more accurate)
baseline assumptions regarding market and investor behavior. Donald
Langevoort, for example, has offered extensive insight into the role
behavioral economics might play in securities regulation, and has
encouraged others to use behavioral approaches to “try to think through
how best to formulate securities law in the face of [] increasing
uncertainty.”61 Many have taken up the challenge.62

For example, legal

commentators have used behavioral economics to examine, inter alia,
overconfidence and internet fraud,63 the fraud-on-the-market presumption

61

Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 135, 138 (2002) (hereinafter
“Animal Spirits”); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992) (hereinafter
“Theories”).
62
For overviews of this commentary, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass
Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); and Donald Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment
and Decisionmaking in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499
(1998).
63
Langevoort, Animal Spirits, supra n.__, at 154-63.
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and truth-on-the-market defense,64 analyst biases,65 judicial treatment of
“puffery” and “materiality,”66 the regulatory power of corporate law,67 and
firms’ decisions to enter markets.68
Uncertainty regarding efficiency and rationality provides the basis to
question not only the existing regulations, but also, perhaps even more
importantly, the absence of regulation. As Langevoort notes, “aggressive
deregulation” has been advocated on the grounds that market efficiency
obviates the need for it.69 Many argue that if markets “disinfect”
themselves, there is no need to burden them with government or private
monitoring.70 As a result, the persistence of EMH may explain the lack of
regulation in certain areas. If the premise of EMH is incorrect, and markets
are not adequately self-policing, the logic of limited regulation and reliance
chiefly on disclosure lacks coherence and credibility.71

64

Id. at 176-81.
Id. at 163-75.
66
Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of
Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99 (2005).
67
Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of
Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002).
68
Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal
Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482 (2002).
69
Langevoort, Animal Spirits, supra n.__, at 152.
70
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1023, 1033 (2000); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1939-40 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 682
(1984).
71
For criticism of behavioral approaches, see Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard,
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) (criticizing limited focus
of behavioral economics, and examining the consequences of applying the theory to
regulators as well as investors); Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?
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Some legal and economic commentators explain the persistence of
the efficient market hypothesis by observing that although behavioral
finance offers a powerful critique of traditional models, it has not
conclusively established the inefficiency of markets.72 They point to the
“inefficiency” model’s inability to account for all possible statistical
variances as the reason the debate remains open in economics and,
consequently, in law.

Yet it is unlikely that the unresolved issues in

statistical modeling alone are adequate to account for the full extent of the
EMH’s continued cultural valence. There is, however, another explanation.
C. Faith in Markets
If the insights of behavioral economics are correct, markets are not
and cannot be governed not by fully informed, rational, self-interested
actors. Instead, they “emerge[] from the internal relations of human and
machinic agents whose knowledge is always mistaken and memories as
well as expectations are inescapably incomplete.”73 In this strange new
world, uncertainty and complexity are the only guarantees. The “invisible
The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM & MARY L.
REV. 1907 (2002).
72
See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 83 (2003) (noting that although the aggregate stock market appears to
be inefficient, individual stock prices can show consistency with the EMH); Morris
Altman, The Nobel Prize in Behavioral & Experimental Economics: A Contextual &
Critical Appraisal of the Contributions of Daniel Kahneman & Vernon Smith, 16 REV.
POLIT. ECON. 3 (2004) (discussing tension between two Nobel Prize winners’ work
showing on the one hand that agents are irrational, and on the other that economies are
efficient).
73
MARK C. TAYLOR, CONFIDENCE GAMES: MONEY & MARKETS IN A WORLD WITHOUT
REDEMPTION 295 (2004).
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hand” is no longer omniscient and omnipotent, but absent and/or
unpredictable.
This loss of certainty provokes a return to faith, as Mark C. Taylor
demonstrates in his compelling recent work, Confidence Games: Money
and Markets in a World Without Redemption.74

Taylor draws on

philosophy, economics, religion and art to develop a cultural philosophy of
markets.

As he describes, when economic behavior is a complex,

networked form of interaction among less-than-rational actors with
incomplete (and often mistaken) knowledge, markets appear far more
volatile and unstable than when economic behavior is construed as reasoned
and informed. If one accepts that people process information not through
rational assessments of their own economic self-interest, but in the
complicated manner conjured by behavioral theorists, markets appear to be
a more uncertain and insecure place.75

Increasing recognition of this

inevitable uncertainty leads to an “understandable desire for certainty,
stability, and world order.”76 As in other realms, in the financial world, the
desire for clarity in the face of inconsistency and uncertainty has lead to a
resurgence of fundamentalist faith – in this case, faith in markets. That is,
when they are faced with uncertainty, people often respond by acting on
faith: They reiterate their commitments to contested ideas with a vigor that
74

Id.
Id. at 301.
76
Id.
75
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is proportional to the level of insecurity they experience and without
validating those ideas based on testable evidence. As Taylor puts it, the
desire to return to stability, “manifest[s] itself in a resurgence of market
fundamentalism.”77
In the nineties, the fundamentalists came to see markets in not just
absolute, but exalted terms. The more entrenched the belief in the market
became, the more marvelous were its attributes. As Thomas Frank has
thoroughly documented, in the popular culture of the nineties, the market
came to be revered as form of divine democracy. “[B]usiness and economic
thinkers” told us that “[o]nly when people act within the marketplace . . . do
they act rationally, choose rightly, and make their wishes known
transparently. . . . Markets are where we are most fully human; markets are
where we show that we have a soul. To protest against markets is to
surrender one’s very personhood, to put oneself outside the family of
mankind.”78 As the sole spaces of true democracy, markets neither needed
nor deserved extensive regulation.

Instead, they must be allowed to

function free from interference, so they in turn could allow investors to be
free to realize their own aspirations. Frank casts this as a “deep and vicious”
hostility toward government and academic critics of market populism
characterized by the belief that “such figures [could] not possibly
77

Id.
THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM, MARKET POPULISM
AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY xiii (2000).
78
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understand the world of the market in all its mystery and complexity” and
that “just by trying to figure things out they commit[ed] acts of hubris and
arrogance, inexcusable offenses against democracy.”79

As Frank

illuminates, the conceptualization of the market as democratic forum
offered yet another reason to limit government interference – regulation was
irreconcilable with the free interactions of the market demos. Like Taylor
and Stiglitz, Frank identifies a persistent religiosity in the business
commentators’ demands for faith in the (redemptive) power of markets.
Criticizing promoters of the new market ideology – from journalists to
advertising executives to management theorists and stock market gurus –
for selling a story of market democracy, Frank portrays their tale as a myth
that succeeds primarily by inculcating a sense of awe in its audience. These
“masters of the New Economy,” he writes, “fancy themselves an exalted
race of divinities, but they counsel the rest of us to become as little children
before the market.”80 Whereas they have unique insight into the market,
others are to trust in them and in the market itself. The “correct intellectual
posture,” demanded by market gurus was not doubt or distrust, but “the
simple faith of childhood.”81 The conservative market populists argued, he
says, “[t]hat democracy was closely related to the holy acts of buying and
selling, and that those who try to control the market are therefore setting
79

Id. at xvi.
Id. at 87.
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themselves against nothing less than the almighty will of the people
themselves.”82

Frank captures the sense that in the nineties, markets

became the new religion, as well as the new democratic forum.83
II. Law’s Responses to the Contestation of Faith
Despite the extensive criticism of rational investor and efficient
market models, described in the preceding Part, disclosure remains the
unthreatened basis of the securities regime. The market orthodoxy that
dominated the business of investing also saturated the securities laws.
Perversely, just as economists have moved away from faith in the purifying
powers of information, the law has increased its emphasis on disclosure.
Legislation, budget cuts, and priority shifting have skewed securities
regulation against third-party policing through government enforcement and
private litigation in favor of self-policing through disclosure.
82

Id. at 47.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, the chiasmus that emerges from this
understanding of market populism warrants further exploration. Frank’s book is written for
a broad audience, and does not delve into the theoretical underpinnings of conceptions of
democracy. It is evokes, however, a chiastic relation between the Greek polis and modern
market populism. Hannah Arendt’s description of the space of public freedom sought by
revolutionaries is eerily similar to Frank’s rendering of the contemporary equation of
markets with democratic possibility. For revolutionaries, Arendt says, freedom “could
exist only in public; it was a tangible, worldly reality, something created by men to be
enjoyed by men rather than a gift or a capacity, it was the man-made public space or
market-place which antiquity had known as the area where freedom appears and becomes
visible to all.” HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 124 (1963). Though far-removed from
the exuberance of IPOs and e-commerce, the conception of democracy in Greek political
thought also centered on the publicity of the market place: “[f]reedom itself needed [] a
place where people could come together – the agora, the market-place, or the polis, the
political space proper.” Id. at 31. The populists’ conception that “free markets are by
definition the same as democracy” and that “any effort to restrict them is an act of
unpardonable pretentiousness, or arrogant disregard for the Will of the People” both inverts
and returns to this original conception.
83
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Congress came to believe that
private securities litigation did not serve markets well.84

As it grew

increasingly critical of perceived abuses of the court system, it rejected the
view that plaintiffs’ actions exposed and deterred fraud, and sought to
alleviate the burden created by private litigation. Where litigants had been
encouraged to supplement government enforcement of the securities laws,85
they came to be seen as gadflies. Corporations – frequent defendants in
such suits – stepped up their pressure for congressional reforms that would
reduce their exposure to class action litigation. At the same time, and
despite strongly argued dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court accepted
and reiterated the charge that frivolous and extortionate securities litigation

84

The Supreme Court appeared to reach a similar conclusion in Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994). In rejecting a form
of liability recognized by hundreds of cases throughout the federal courts, the Central Bank
majority expressed a clear desire to protect business against what it described as “decisions
made on an ad hoc basis, offering little predictive value,” based on highly fact-oriented
assessments of the claims. In so deciding, the Court again discussed the unique
“vexatiousness” of Rule 10b-5 litigation, and considered the far-reaching effects it feared
such suits might have. It warned that “this uncertainty and excessive litigation can have
ripple effects,” making it difficult for emerging companies to obtain professional advice. It
also posited that entities facing aider and abettor liability might find it “prudent and
necessary as a business judgment, to abandon substantial defenses and to pay settlements in
order to avoid the expense and risk of going to trial.” As the Central Bank dissent
discussed at length, however, the federal courts had long interpreted Rule 10b-5 to include
aiding and abetting liability, and had developed a substantial body of case law to govern
such claims. On the dissent’s view, aiding and abetting liability not only had proven
manageable, but had played an important role in reducing fraud.
85
The Supreme Court, for example, had stated that “implied private actions provide a most
effective weapon in the enforcement of the securities laws and are a necessary supplement
to Commission action.” Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310
(1985) quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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was clogging the federal court system.86 Whether those class action suits
were indeed frivolous and extortionate, or instead legitimate efforts to
recover losses suffered as a result of fraud, remains a matter of debate.87 In
all likelihood, the truth lies somewhere between the competing claims: The
suits were neither as egregious as charged, nor as wholesome as their
lawyers claimed. Nonetheless, the 1990s reform acts reflect and comprise a
86

Like Congress, the courts have played a significant role in developing the scope and
substance of the private cause of action for securities fraud and the resulting allocation of
burdens among plaintiffs and defendants. Courts have played this unusually substantial role
in the development of Section 10(b) claims due to the nature and origin of the private cause
of action. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not itself provide a private cause of
action for securities fraud, nor did Congress explicitly consider creating such a cause of
action. Instead, the private cause of action has been implied under Rule 10b-5. Like
Congress, however, the Commission did not explicitly consider whether the provision it
had drafted provided for private civil remedies. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 3230 (1942). Instead, Rule 10b-5 is a “judicial oak that has grown from little more
than a legislative acorn.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 423 U.S. 723, 737
(1975). Relying on the unusual origin of the Section 10(b) private cause of action, the
Court consistently has assumed broad responsibility in this area of the law. In Blue Chip,
for example, it restricted Section 10(b) litigation, noting that “there has been widespread
recognition that litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in
degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general.” Id. at 739. Not long
after Blue Chip, in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court declined to
extend Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability to the misappropriation of public
information. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented and cautioned that the
Court’s decision strayed from its principle of interpreting the securities laws flexibly. They
warned that “the Court continues to pursue a course, charted in recent decisions, designed
to transform Section 10(b) from an intentionally elastic ‘catchall’ provision to one that
catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes investment in securities
a needlessly risk business for the uninitiated investor.” 445 U.S. at 246; see also Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As the Court continued to limit the
scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions in later cases, strong dissents repeatedly
criticized the majority for failing to recognize and protect the important role private
litigants played in policing the securities markets. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis
& Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (holding Section 10(b) claims to the shorter
statute of limitations period contained in other provisions of the securities laws, rather than
the more generous period provided by the state statute of limitations for fraud claims);
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 189
(1994) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that Section 10(b) liability extends to “aiders and
abettors” of securities fraud).
87
See Joel Seligman, The Merits Still Do Matter: A Rejoinder to Professor Grundfest’s
Comment Why Dismply, 108 HARV. L. REV. 748 (1995).
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concerted effort to restrain civil securities litigation.88 They can be best
understood as a series of responses to plaintiffs’ litigation strategies that
Congress found to be unduly burdensome for corporations and capital
markets and as an assertion of Congress’ faith in markets in the face of
mounting challenges.89 This Part considers each of the major acts in turn,
examining how they adhere to the belief that there is minimal need for civil
litigants to aggressively police markets because disclosure can be relied
upon to ensure their integrity. Under the most recent reforms, disclosure
has broadened its dominance at the expense of litigation.

That is, the

relationship between disclosure and litigation has begun a strange
conversion. Where adjudication and disclosure each had appeared to be
necessary but not sufficient to market regulation, the recent reforms assume
that when disclosure is sufficient, litigation is not necessary. This Part
concludes that the law’s emerging belief that disclosure is not just a
necessary but a sufficient, means of policing markets is irreconcilable with
contemporary economic theory and practical experience of securities fraud.
It considers how each Act minimizes the enforcement function of private
litigation and increases the work disclosure is expected to perform. With

88

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 extended this trend to other areas of the law as
well. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1475, 1514-20 (2005); and see infra n.__.
89
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 departs from this trend, in that it responds to the
corporate catastrophes of Enron, WorldCom and their ilk, and takes a much broader and
more substantive approach to regulation than the procedure-oriented 1995 and 1998 Acts.
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respect to each statute, the Part considers the underlying assumptions, the
key provisions, and the theoretical commitments embedded therein.
A. The Reform Acts
1. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
A chorus of critics emerged in the early nineties, charging that
securities fraud class action suits were driven by lawyers, not clients; based
on stock price movement, not genuine fear of fraud; seeking quick
settlement, not resolution on the merits; and were unjustly hampering
capital formation, not legitimately policing market malfeasance.90 When
the Republicans assumed control of Congress in 1994, they acted swiftly to
translate the corporate and judicial criticisms of plaintiffs’ use of federal
courts into securities reform legislation.91 The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”)92 was the first major reform act to
90

As one New York Times article described it, during the Congressional debates, the issues
were “dominated by caricature. Congressional critics [] vilified lawyers who file securities
class-action cases as fee-hungry extortionists who do nothing to help investors. Corporate
executives dismiss the plaintiffs in those suits as cynical opportunists who buy stock only
to gain suing rights. Class-action lawyers condemn their corporate critics as greedy
hucksters seeking a license to steal.” Diana B. Henriques, Investing It: Making It Harder
for Investors to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995 at Sec. 3, 1. Henriques’s article goes on to
offer an alternative, balanced portrayal of numerous individuals on both sides of the issue.
Other discussions of these tensions can be found in, e.g., Suits or Straitjackets?,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 1995, at 20; Benjamin Weiser, High-Tech Firms Decry Frivolous
Suits; America Online Chairman Says Laws Stacked Against Companies, WASH. POST,
March 7, 1995, at D3; Shareholder Suits; Class Acts, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 95;
Bruce Rubenstein, Cease & Desist, CORP. LEG. TIMES, Sept. 1994, at 1.
91
Some claimed that the haste to legislate during the first 100 days of Republican control
of the House of Representatives led to poorly crafted legislation. See, e.g., Jeff Gerth,
Overhaul of Securities Laws: A Fast Track to Change or a Hasty Decision?, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1995, at A19 (reporting on discussion regarding the speed and possible
shortsightedness of the PSLRA legislative process).
92
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-1, 77z-1 to z-2, 78u-4 to
78u-5, 78j-1 (Supp. II. 1996)).
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emerge out of the harsh and sustained criticism of private class action
securities litigation. As demonstrated in this section, the PSLRA’s response
to these concerns reveals the congressional commitment to disclosure as the
primary means of preventing and exposing malfeasance. Congress’s faith
in the disclosure principle is manifested by (a) the general distrust of private
litigation which was the motivating force behind the PSLRA’s enactment
and (b) the specific reforms it adopted.
(a) Distrust of Litigation
The PSLRA arose directly from key underlying beliefs about the
dangers of private securities litigation. First, Congress was persuaded that
there was a significant gap between the amount of securities fraud and the
amount of securities litigation.

It accepted the view that profligate

plaintiffs’ attorneys were filing a crippling amount of meritless lawsuits.93
The Senate Report, for example, observed that “[a]lthough private securities
class actions can complement SEC enforcement actions, the evils flowing
from abusive securities litigation start with the filing of the complaint and
continue through to the final disposition.”94 Critics of private securities
litigation persuasively argued that many suits were based on shifts in stock
prices that naturally resulted from legitimate business and market practices,
93

S. REP. 104-98, at 4-9, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679; H.R. REP. 104-50(I), at 15,
14-20 (1995), (adopting the view of the “many executives of companies in the accounting,
securities, and manufacturing industries” who “believe that the civil liability system has
been twisted and is operating against them.”).
94
S. REP. 104-98, at 8.
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not from fraud.95 The breadth of Section 10(b) allowed plaintiffs to bring a
seemingly endless range of complaints. Section 10(b)96 has been described
as “a catchall antifraud provision.”97 It reaches a virtually limitless range of
fraudulent conduct, as it makes it unlawful to use “any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.98 In addition, unlike certain provisions of the 1933 Act, which
specifically limit the range of potential defendants,99 any defendant who
engages in fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security may
be liable for Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations.100

95

See S. REP. 104-98, at 4 (discussing strike suits); H.R. REP. 104-50(I), at 15 (same).
See Section 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. Section 10(b) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange - . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule 10b-5, the parallel regulation, gives rise to the private cause of
action. It provides that it is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
97
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
98
15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (emphasis added).
99
See, e.g. Section 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (establishing liability for specified individuals and
entities in connection with registration statements); Section 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2)
(establishing liability for sellers of securities in connection with prospectus statements).
100
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. Untied States, 406 U.S. 128, 151-52 (1972). Section 10(b) also provides more extensive
96
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Congress also pointed to the generous federal pleading standards of
the federal courts as particularly susceptible to exploitation by plaintiffs and
their attorneys. Although Rule 9 provided that plaintiffs must plead fraud
claims with particularity,101 all non-fraud claims in the same action needed
to meet only the far more lenient notice pleading standards of Rule 8.102 In
addition, even the burdensome Rule 9 requirements were mitigated by
federal securities fraud doctrines.103 Third, plaintiffs were able to invoke

damages for successful plaintiffs than do the 1933 Act causes of action. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (which do not specify damages rules) with 15
U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (providing for damages limited to rescission or its equivalent) and 15
U.S.C. § 77k (limiting damages based on purchase price, sale price, and of sale). See also
LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION at 1287-94 (discussing
general rules for Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 damages and their “voracious exceptions”).
101
Rule 9(b), FED. R. CIV. P. (requiring allegations of fraud to be stated with particularity).
102
Rule 8, FED. R. CIV. P. (requiring a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief).
103
Applied literally, Rule 9 appears to require specific pleadings with respect to each
element of the Section 10(b) claim, including that plaintiffs’ relied on defendants’ material
misrepresentation or omission. In the Second Circuit, for example, an allegation of fraud
must specify “(1) those statements the plaintiff thinks were fraudulent, (2) the speaker, (3)
where and when they were made, and (4) why the plaintiff believes the statements to be
fraudulent.” Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda (New York) Ltd., 209 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir.
2000). The requisite scienter may, however, be pleaded generally. See Rule 9(b), FED. R.
CIV. P.; Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2001). The Private Securities
Litigation Act of 1995 raised the pleading standard for federal securities fraud cases by
adopting the language of the Second Circuit standard. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ub-4. Although
many – including President Clinton – feared that Congress intended to impose a pleading
standard higher than the Second Circuit’s, see President’s Message to the House of
Representatives Returning Without Approval the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
31 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2210 (Dec. 19, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S19034
(Dec. 21, 1995), courts have since reached a variety of interpretations. Compare GSC
Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 236-67 (3d Cir. 2004); Southland Sec.
Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, 365 F.3d 353, 361-65 (5th Cir. 2004); PR Diamonds, Inc. v.
Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2004); Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 429 (9th
Cir. 2001); Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 138; and Koehler, 209 F.3d at 136. See also Christopher M.
Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 600-12 (2002); Gregory P. Joseph,
How to Prepare for and Successfully Try a Securities Class Action in the Post-Reform Era,
1190 PRAC. L. INST./CORP. 89, 102-03 (2000); Michael Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter
After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, A Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 193 (1998).
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the statutory provisions enabling federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over
pendent and ancillary state law claims.104 Thus, plaintiffs did not need to
forgo any of their state law claims in order to pursue their Section 10(b)
claims in federal court. Instead, they were able to pursue their state law
claims using the more favorable discovery tools and notice pleading
standards of the federal courts.
Congress also accepted the charge that a significant proportion of
securities class actions were brought not to recover losses for deserving
investors, but to obtain enormous fees for greedy lawyers.105 Extensive
testimony before Congress supported these views.106 Class actions were

Plaintiffs are able to avoid such specific and difficult pleadings in securities fraud
cases, however, because the federal courts had adopted the fraud-on-the-market hypothesis.
See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988). For a discussion of the fraud-on-themarket theory and a consideration of how it is affected by the PSLRA, see Jeffrey L.
Oldham, Comment, Taking “Efficient Markets” out of the Fraud-on
- the-Market Doctrine
After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 995 (2003); and see
supra at ___.
104
28 U.S.C. § 1367.
105
See S. REP. 104-98, at 12-13; H.R. REP. 104-50(I), at 18-19. Striking disparities
between lawyers’ fees and plaintiffs’ awards were widely reported. See Saundra Torry,
Going to the Head of the Class Action Settlement, WASH. POST, April 8, 1996, at F7
(discussing cases in which class members received awards of stickers and coupons while
their lawyers sought millions of dollars in fees); Kurt Eichenwald, Millions for Us, Pennies
for You, NY TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993, at Sec. 3, 1 (discussing case in which investor received
pennies on the dollar for her losses while the law firm representing the class received six
million dollars in fees, plus expenses); Nancy Rutter, Bill Lerach Thinks of Himself as
Robin Hood in a Class-Action Suit, FORBES 116 (Oct. 9, 1995); Barry Meir, Math of A
Class-Action Suit: “Winning” $2.19 Costs $ 91.33, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at A1.
106
See, e.g., Concerning H.R. 10 and Securities Litigation Reform, Testimony Before the
Subcomm. On Telecommunications & Finance of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
(1995), 1995 WL 57112 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman,
International Financial Services, Coopers & Lybrand LLP); Private Securities Litigation
Revision, Prepared Statement, submitted to the Subcomm on Telecommunications &
Finance of the Senate Comm. on Commerce (1995) (statement of Daniel R. Fischel,
University of Chicago Professor of Law); Common Sense Legal Reforms Act, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications & Finance of the House Comm. on Comm.,
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also seen as a major (and unwarranted) impediment to business and to the
capital formation process.107 Where courts and commentators in the past
had recognized the important public role private litigation could play in
policing market malfeasance, the new Congress rejected this possibility. It
found that class actions placed enormous burdens on corporate defendants,
and gave little consideration to any countervailing benefits such actions
might provide.
Tales of discovery abuses by class action plaintiffs also provided an
impetus for reform.

In particular, criticism focused on the fact that

plaintiffs and defendants in federal securities litigation faced asymmetrical
discovery burdens.

While defendants often were required to produce

voluminous records and numerous deponents,108 plaintiffs faced few
discovery obligations at this early stage of the litigation. Critics contended
that plaintiffs abused the discovery rules in two ways. First, because they

(Jan. 19, 1995) (statement of Dennis W. Bakke, President & CEO, The AES Corporation);
Concerning Securities Litigation Reform, Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Securities of
the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., (April 6, 1995) (statement of
Charles C. Cox, Senior Vice President of Lexecon, Inc.).
107
S. REP. 104-98, at 16-17; H.R. REP 104-50(I), at 14-15; Private Litigation Under the
Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. On Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 280, at 2 (1993)
(statement of Senator Dodd); id. at 3 (statement of Senator Riegle); id. at 12 (statement of
Edward R. McCracken, President, Silicon Graphics, Inc.); id. at 37 (statement of William
R. McLucas, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement).
108
Securities fraud cases were subject to the same discovery rules as other civil actions in
federal court. For the relevant discovery rules, see FED. R. CIV. P. 26-35. By contrast,
discovery in state court practice is often stayed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.
See, e.g., New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, § 3214(b) (providing that service of
notice of a motion to dismiss stays the defendant’s disclosure obligations until the motion
is decided).
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could take extensive discovery early in the litigation, they were able to file
complaints based on little if any information and then to attempt to unearth
evidence of fraud later.109

Second, because discovery is disruptive,

expensive and time-consuming for defendants, the threat – or reality – of
extensive discovery obligations forced defendants to settle regardless of the
merit of the claims.110 Indeed, some critics even charged that defendants
and plaintiffs’ lawyers settled too early in many legitimate cases. They
contended that plaintiffs’ lawyers were willing to take early settlements that
provided substantial attorneys fees but little investor compensation when
they should have expended additional time and resources to aggressively
pursue more appropriate recovery for the members of the class.111

109

The Senate Report, for example, concluded that plaintiffs “sometimes filed frivolous
lawsuits” in the hopes that discovery would provide a basis for their claims. S. REP. 10498, at 14. It relied on testimony from one executive who stated that “once the suit is filed,
the plaintiff’s law firm proceeds to search through all of the company’s documents and take
endless depositions for the slightest positive comment which they can claim induced the
plaintiff to invest and any shred of evidence that the company knew a downturn was
coming.” Id. (citation omitted). According to general counsel of an investment bank,
“discovery costs account for roughly 80% of total litigation costs in securities fraud cases.”
Id. (citation omitted).
110
S. REP. 104-98, at 14. See also Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study
of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (contending that
class action settlements in securities litigation are often neither voluntary nor accurate
reflections of the merits of the claims). For criticism of Alexander’s analysis, see Joel
Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying
Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority,”
108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 453 (1994).
111
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt testified that “counsel may have a greater incentive than
the members of the class to accept a settlement that provides a significant fee and
eliminates any risk of failure to recoup funds already invested in the case.” Securities
Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Congr. 2d Sess., 35-36 (1994). He also
noted that if the defendant does not prevail on an early motion to dismiss, “the economics
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In addition, the mere existence of unresolved fraud allegations also
was alleged to have prompted defendants to settle spurious claims. Critics
of securities fraud class actions contended that merely by bringing fraud
allegations plaintiffs were able to cast a pall over a defendant corporation,
and that corporations thus targeted were willing to settle meritless claims
simply in order to remove the cloud of suspicion.112 Plaintiffs – and in
particular, plaintiffs’ class action lawyers – were believed to be exploiting
this side effect of litigation to extort settlements far greater than the likely
and appropriate value of a recovery at trial.113
The PSLRA reveals the congressional commitment to disclosure as
the primary means of preventing and exposing malfeasance. Congress’s
faith in disclosure appears in two forms: First, in its general distrust of
private litigation, and second, in the type of reforms it adopted.

The

PSLRA reflects deep suspicion towards private litigation as a legitimate
means of deterring and revealing securities fraud. Each of the driving
assumptions of the Act stems from a belief that the amount of securities
litigation far exceeded the amount of securities fraud. Condemnation of the
frequency of suits, the extensive use of federal discovery mechanisms, and

of litigation may dictate a settlement even if the defendant is relatively confident that it
would prevail at trial.” Id. at 36.
112
S. REP. 104-98, at 21. For a reporter’s overview of the argument, see Kathleen Day,
When Shareholders Sue Is It a Matter of Justice for Aggrieved Investors or “Legal
Extortion”?, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2004, at F1.
113
S. Rep. 104-98, at 21-22.
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large settlements all amounts to condemnation of the process of litigation
itself.

When Congress enacted the PSLRA, it codified the belief that

litigation was much less necessary and less useful than plaintiffs had
claimed.
This suspicion of litigation is the complement of faith in disclosure.
Assuming that Congress seeks to ensure market integrity and to eradicate
fraud, it traditionally has used two tools. One is the system of mandatory
disclosure, which is designed to prevent and expose fraud before and as it
happens. The other is enforcement – both public and private. The use of
enforcement recognizes that markets cannot be entirely self-policing: some
malfeasance will occur that participants will not be able to avoid or recover
from. Enforcment actions – brought by the SEC, the Department of Justice,
private litigants, State Attorneys-General, self-regulatory organizations –
provide an added layer of security, policing the markets from without as
disclosure allows them to be judged from within. The PSLRA strongly
favors the first of these tools (disclosure) over the second (enforcement).
This favoritism emerges both ideologically and practically. Leading up to
the passage of the PSLRA and throughout the congressional hearings,
extensive testimony attacked litigation as a blight on the market system, a
scourge that served no one but greedy plaintiffs’ attorneys. This conceptual
antipathy toward private litigation created the impetus for the significant
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procedural reforms of the PSLRA. The faith that disclosure, rather than
private enforcement, could ensure market integrity then provided the basis
for the nature of those reforms.
(b) The PSLRA Reforms
Each of four significant PSLRA provisions reflects and codifies a
faith in disclosure as the primary means of preventing and exposing
securities fraud. The key reforms of the PSLRA included (a) a heightened
pleading standard, requiring plaintiffs to include allegations giving rise to a
strong inference of fraudulent intent on the part of defendants114; (b) an
automatic stay of discovery upon the filing of a motion to dismiss115; (c)
lead plaintiff provisions designed to wrest control of the litigation from
lawyers and return it to their clients – the class and its representatives116;
and (d) a statutory safe-harbor for forward-looking statements.117

114

See PSLRA § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (amending Section 21D of the 1934 Act).
See PSLRA § 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (amending Section 27(b) of the
1933 Act and Section 21D(b) of the 1934 Act).
116
See PSLRA § 101, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3) (amending Section 27(b) of
the 1933 Act and Section 21D(b) of the 1934 Act). The lead plaintiff provision creates a
presumption that the plaintiff who has the largest financial interest in the case and who
otherwise satisfies the class representatives of Rule 23 should serve as lead plaintiff. See 15
U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I); FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The PSLRA reform was crafted to
“increase the likelihood that institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs.” S. REP.
104-98, at 11 (1995); see also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 6 (1995). The lead plaintiff
in turn is to select and retain lead counsel, subject to the approval of the district court. See
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B). The appointment process for lead plaintiff is designed to be
competitive in the hopes that competition will ensure that the best plaintiff guides the class.
A final provision to ensure plaintiffs are not mere puppets of their lawyers requires the lead
plaintiff to file a sworn statement certifying that they have reviewed and authorized the
complaint, that they did not purchase securities at the direction of counsel or for the
purpose of pursuing litigation. See id.
117
See PSLRA § 102, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (amending the 1933 and 1934 Acts).
115

49

Fighting Fraud on Faith

September 5, 2005

First, the heightened pleading standard requires plaintiffs to make
allegations giving rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent. Because
plaintiffs must make these allegations in the complaint – at the very
commencement of litigation, prior to any initial disclosures or discovery –
such allegations can only be possible if one assumes that sufficient evidence
of the defendants’ fraudulent intent will be publicly available. Although it
may be easily established in some cases, fraudulent intent – or the scienter
necessary to sustain a Section 10(b) claim – can be difficult to plead in
detail prior to discovery. Indeed, Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which governs the pleading of fraud claims, recognizes this
difficulty by permitting scienter to be pleaded generally, rather than with
the particularity required of other fraud allegations.118

The PSLRA

heightened pleading standard instead assumes that in meritorious fraud
cases, disclosure and public information will provide sufficient evidence of
intent to enable plaintiffs to meet this high threshold.
Second, the PSLRA requirement that discovery be automatically
stayed upon the filing of a motion to dismiss securities fraud claims also
reflects a belief that all of the information required to plead the fraud claims
will be publicly available. Again, the legislation trusts in disclosure – in the
public availability of all relevant information – to provide the basis for
118

Under Rule 9(b), “[m]alice, intent, knowledge and other conditions of mind of a person
may be averred generally.” Rule 9(b), FED. R. CIV. P.
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enforcement. This kind of legislation limits the investigative power of
litigation.

On this approach, litigation has no independent expositive

purpose: instead, it primarily forces it instead to seek redress for fraud that
is already evident.
monitor markets.

Here, litigation must serve to process claims, not
The true monitoring is to be done through public

disclosure.
Third, the adoption of a safe-harbor for forward-looking information
again reflects a faith in disclosure to process and evaluate issuer
information. Unlike the pleading and discovery provisions, the statutory
safe-harbor does not directly address the litigation process. Under certain
conditions it does, however, respond to pressure from public companies to
insulate predictive statements from liability. In this sense, it again reflects a
belief that if the information is publicly disclosed, in the appropriate
context, with the correct disclaimers, then the market will be able to process
the information and appropriately value the related securities. Like the
other two provisions, it distances litigation from the process of checking the
accuracy of such statements or to expose misrepresentations. Again, the
burden is mainly on the market – the disclosure system – to evaluate and
monitor the statements.
A fourth noteworthy provision of the PSLRA, the lead plaintiff
provision, is unique. Unlike the other three, it addresses directly what was
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alleged to be the primary evil of private securities class action litigation: its
domination by self-interested, over-zealous plaintiffs’ attorneys, who sued
on their own behalves, and cared little, if anything, for the interests of the
class (and indeed, were alleged to have “created” the class by employing socalled professional plaintiffs).119 The lead plaintiff provision does not turn
on the availability of information in the public sphere. Rather, it uses
procedural mechanisms and prerequisites to increase the likelihood that
class litigation will be driven by plaintiffs who are highly motivated and
legitimately concerned in the outcome of the case, and that those plaintiffs
will direct their lawyers, not vice versa. It does so by amending Section 27
of the Securities Act to provide for appointment of a lead plaintiff “the
member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court
determines to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of
class members” and institutes a rebuttable presumption that the most
adequate person is the person that “has the largest financial interest in the

119

Milberg Weiss was singled out for particular castigation during the legislative process.
Recently, news reports have stated that federal prosecutors have been investigating Milberg
Weiss for four years in connection with the firm’s practices in civil securities class actions.
One of the “professional plaintiffs” has been indicted, and three partners of the former firm
– including William Lerach, their lead lawyer for the WorldCom litigation – have been told
that they face possible criminal indictment. See Prosecutors Step Up Probe of Milberg
Weiss Law Firm, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2005, at A1; Timothy L. O’Brien & Jonathan D.
Glater, Robin Hoods or Legal Hoods? The Government Takes Aim at a Class Action
Powerhouse, NY TIMES, July 17, 2005, at B1.
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relief sought by the class” who otherwise satisfies the Rule 23
requirements.120
In sum, of four main PSLRA reforms, three rest on a faith in
disclosure to prevent and expose fraud ex ante, and reduce litigants’ ability
to investigate, uncover, prosecute and hence deter fraud.
After the PSLRA’s adoption, commentators and corporate
defendants closely followed class action plaintiffs’ responses.

Many

securities class actions continued to be filed in federal court, but it appeared
that the number filed in state courts had increased significantly.121

It

seemed that the PSLRA had shifted the balance in favor of state litigation:

120

15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a) (3)(b). By preferring the appointment of the person or persons
with the largest financial interest in the action, the lead-plaintiff provisions adopted a
preference for large institutions over individual investors.
121
Claims brought under state law, for example, might be eligible for punitive damages
awards. Although moving to state court made it more difficult for plaintiffs to pursue
nationwide class actions, they could compensate by bringing statewide class actions in
multiple states. Plaintiffs in state court could not avail themselves of the fraud on the
market theory, as they had in federal court, but they also did not have to meet the
heightened pleading standard imposed by the PSLRA. In sum, plaintiffs were quick to
interpret the new law and to identify its weaknesses. They saw that although the PSLRA
foreclosed some options, it left others open and adapted their approaches accordingly. See
Michael A. Perino, Legislative Forward, Fraud & Federalism: Preempting Private State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 302-03 (1998); Office of
General Counsel, SEC, Report to the President and the Congress on the First Year of
Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, at 68-69 (Apr. 1997);
Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year’s
Experience at 9 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School,
Working Paper No. 140, Feb. 1997); Denise M. Martin, Vinita M. Juneja, Todd S. Foster &
Frederick C. Dunbar, Recent Trends IV: What Explains Filings and Settlements in
Shareholder Class Actions? 8 (National Economic Research Associates, Nov. 1996). But
see Richard W. Painter, Responding to A False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42-45 (1998).
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post-PSLRA, the benefits of state court compensated for having to forgo
some of the advantages of federal court. 122
Only a few years after its implementation, many proponents of the
securities reforms concluded that the PSLRA had failed. They returned to
Congress with new complaints about exploitative plaintiffs’ strategies, and
sought additional legislation designed to further constrain class action
litigation and to effectuate the PSLRA requirements.123
2. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
Congress responded to the plaintiffs’ adaptations to the PSRLA by
enacting a second major securities litigation reform act. Passed in 1998, the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”)124 contained
procedural requirements designed to return securities fraud class actions to
federal court in order to give effect to the litigation restrictions of the
PSLRA. SLUSA’s main achievement in this regard was its approach to
preemption and removal of the offending class actions. SLUSA preempted
securities fraud claims under state law, when alleged in “covered class
actions.”125 Its preemption provision provides:

122

See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, IX SECURITIES REGULATION at 4424-46 (3d Ed.
1992).
123
See, e.g., David Segal, Cases Contingent on Bad News; Lawyers in Shareholder Suits
Drawing Big Fees – and Strong Criticism, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1997, at G1 (discussing
lobbying efforts).
124
Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
125
“Covered class actions” are defined in reference to the “covered securities” that
Congress defined and subjected to exclusive federal regulatory authority in Section 18 of
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(a) &

54

Fighting Fraud on Faith

September 5, 2005

No covered class action based upon the statutory or common
law of any State . . . may be maintained in any State or
Federal court by any private party alleging – (1) an untrue
statement or omission of a material fact in connection with
the purchase or sale of a covered security; or (2) that the
defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale
of a covered security.126
SLUSA’s narrow focus is evident on its face. It does not preempt state law
securities fraud causes of action: Instead, it preempts state securities fraud
claims only when they are alleged by a “covered class action.” SLUSA’s
approach reflects its underlying assumptions and motive: that class actions
(not state securities laws) are threatening, and that federal law must rein
them in.127
SLUSA ensures a particularly aggressive form of preemption.
Typically, when a state law claim is preempted by federal law, the motion
to dismiss would be brought in and decided by the state court: where federal
law preempts, the state court is required to dismiss. SLUSA, by contrast,
77r(b)(1)-(4). The covered class action provision includes a “carve out” designed to
exclude from preemption state lawsuits brought as shareholder derivative suits. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77p(d)(1); see also David M. Levine & Adam C. Prichard, The Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS.
LAW. 1, 24 (1998).
126
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b).
127
On the uniqueness and constitutionality of the SLUSA preemption and removal
provisions, see A.C. Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, & the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U.L.Q. 435 (2000).
Despite its facially narrow focus, SLUSA’s place in the accumulation of federal securities
law reforms may have caused it to have a more significant effect on the basic federal/state
divide over corporate governance than one might expect. Robert B. Thompson has argued
that SLUSA’s enactment shifted this balance and increased the importance of shareholders’
voting role relative to other shareholder functions. See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption
& Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, &
Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (1999).
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requires the action first to be removed to federal court, then, when
appropriate, to be dismissed by the federal court as preempted by the federal
law. 128
The removal provision is designed to prevent securities fraud class
action plaintiffs from circumventing the reforms of the PSLRA through
tactical use of state court procedures and, more broadly, from using the state
courts to their advantage at all. Congress (and the corporate lobby) feared
that if class actions alleging state fraud claims were preempted but not
removed, extensive litigation over whether or not the claims were covered
could still continue in state court.129
SLUSA’s removal provision helps to render the PSLRA effective in
two ways. First, removal triggers the federal PSLRA discovery stay, thus
preventing plaintiffs’ from evading that restriction and burdening
defendants with discovery requests that the PLSRA sought to limit.130
Second, because the question of preemption will be decided by federal,
rather than state, courts, Congress expected the SLUSA removal provision
to provide greater uniformity in interpretation of the scope of preemption.131
By targeting the form, rather than the content, of securities actions, SLUSA

128

See Pritchard, supra, n.__, at 490-91.
H.R. Rep. No. 105-640, at 16 (1998) ("This provision is designed to prevent a State
court from inadvertently, improperly, or otherwise maintaining jurisdiction over an action
that is preempted . . . .”).
130
Pritchard, supra, n.__, at 491.
131
Id.
129
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has achieved its stated goal: Federal courts are now, with limited exception,
the sole fora in which class actions involving covered securities may be
pursued.132
Like the PSLRA before it, SLUSA was driven by key underlying
assumptions regarding private securities litigation. First, it responded to
concerns that the PSLRA had not constrained securities litigation, but
merely had shifted it from federal to state court.133

132

How Congress –

In February 2005, Congress passed and the President signed into law, legislation that
applies a SLUSA-like approach to all major, national class action litigation. Like SLUSA,
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Public Law 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (Feb. 18,
2005), was motivated by concerns about the merits and extortionate effects of class action
litigation, and the over-zealous and allegedly self-interested role played by plaintiffs’
attorneys. CAFA amends the federal diversity jurisdiction statute to extend the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to a broad range of class action litigation. It eliminates the requirement
of complete diversity as among defendants and class representatives by permitting
jurisdiction where any class member is diverse from any defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(d)(2)(A). In addition, CAFA amends the amount-in-controversy requirement for class
actions to provide that “the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated” to
meet the requirement, rather than considered individually, as under the prior law. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). CAFA does include certain limitations on federal jurisdiction over
such interstate class actions, however. Like SLUSA, it includes what amounts to a
Delaware carve-out by excluding class actions that relate to the internal affairs or
governance of a corporation and that arise under the law of the state of incorporation or
organization. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9). Also, since SLUSA already preempts and
removes class actions regarding covered securities, they are excluded from CAFA’s
purview. CAFA also includes exceptions regarding the number and/or type of plaintiffs
and defendants who are citizens of the state, the total number of class members, the
involvement of States of State officials as defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2)-(5).
133
Senator Christopher Dodd, for example, explained that new legislation was needed in
part because the PSLRA was “working so well on the Federal level that weaker claims
have migrated from Federal courts to State courts . . . a development that threatens . . . the
success that we have achieved to date in this general area.” The Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1997 – S-1260: Hearings on S. 1260 Before the Subcomm. on
Sec. of the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. at 15
(opening statement of Senator Christopher J. Dodd) (Oct. 29, 1997). This sentiment was
reflected in the language of the statute itself. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998, § 2(2), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (“The Congress finds that . . . (2)
since enactment of [the PSLRA], considerable evidence has been presented to Congress
that a number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State courts . .
. “). See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-803, at 13, reprinted in 144 Cong. Rec. H11, 021
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influenced heavily by anti-class action commentators and the corporate
lobby – perceived this shift determined its response. It appeared to many
that the shift from federal to state court simply indicated how far the greedy
plaintiffs’ bar was willing to go to extort settlements (and their exorbitant
attorneys’ fees) from corporate targets.134 Few, if any, suggested that the
suits had shifted because investors continued to be defrauded and to need
fora in which to pursue their claims. Few, if any, contested the assumptions
that the shift had indeed occurred and that it was undermining the PSLRA
reforms.135 In addition to concerns about the ways in which plaintiffs’
adaptations had rendered the PSLRA ineffective, Congress responded to
concerns that an increase in state claims and state litigation would in turn
produce an increase in state legislation. Citing reforms proposed by the
plaintiffs’ bar in California,136 many warned that securities regulation was

(Oct. 15, 1998); Painter, supra n.__, at 42-45 (describing this claim and questioning its
empirical support). For studies assessing the migration, see supra n.__.
134
See generally, David Segal, Cases Contingent on Bad News; Lawyers in Shareholder
Suits Drawing Big Fees – and Strong Criticism, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1997, at G1
(reporting on claims that plaintiffs had “made an end-run” around PSLRA reforms); Bruce
Rubenstein, Fraud Failsafe or License to Lie, CORP. LEG. TIMES, Nov. 1997, at 1
(discussing post-PSLRA plaintiffs’ tactics).
135
Noteworthy among the exceptions were Richard Painter and Joel Seligman –
Seligman’s cautionary analysis coming even before the passage of the PSLRA. See
generally Painter, Responding to a False Alarm, supra n.__; Seligman, supra n.__.
136
A November referendum ballot in California included Proposition 211, a law proposed
and drafted primarily by plaintiffs’ attorneys and designed to make it easier for investors to
sue companies and their executives. See Retirement Savings & Consumer Protection Act,
Prop. 211, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. No. 10, at A-20 (West); see also
Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State
Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 683 (1997); Elizabeth Corcoran, A Contentious
Proposition: California Firms Fight Move to Make it Easier for Investors to Sue, WASH.
POST, Sept. 24, 1996, at C1. The measure was defeated.
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on the verge of a “race-to-the-bottom,” in which states would enact laws in
a competition to be generous to plaintiffs and hostile to nationally traded
public companies.137
SLUSA also reiterates suspicion of private litigation as a legitimate
means of monitoring markets. Instead of considering whether plaintiffs had
moved to state court because the federal restrictions were burdening
meritorious claims, Congress saw the purported migration as further
evidence of attorneys’ exploitative tactics. SLUSA was designed primarily
to ensure the effectiveness of the PSLRA reforms and it consequently
shares the same concerns and motivation as the PSLRA: distrust of
plaintiffs and a desire to minimize and constrain private securities litigation.
3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
In 2002, Congress again undertook major reform of the securities
laws. The Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002,
commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, responded to a new set of
concerns, using a different set of tools.138 Where the PSLRA and SLUSA
addressed the perceived excesses of the plaintiffs’ bar, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act responded to a flood of revelations of massive corporate fraud.

137

Of course, whether this is a race to the top or to the bottom depends on one’s
perspective. But many considered the possible consequences of a “Delawarization” of
state securities fraud laws. See Painter, Responding to a False Alarm, supra n.___, at 7175 (discussing this debate); Perino, Fraud & Federalism, supra n.__, at 322-29.
138
See Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate & Securities Law After
Enron, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 449 (2002).
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Although in 2002 the tide had turned from condemnation of
plaintiffs’ lawyers to that of corporate malfeasants, Congress’s response to
the flood of fraud was largely an emphatic reaffirmation of faith in the
disclosure principle. The Senate Report described the Act’s purpose as “to
address the systemic and structural weaknesses affecting our capital markets
which were revealed by repeated failures of audit effectiveness and
corporate financial and broker-dealer responsibility in recent months and
years. . . . The bill [] requires steps to enhance the direct responsibility of
senior corporate management for financial reporting and for the quality of
financial disclosures made by public companies.”139 As this statement of
purpose indicates, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act focuses on personal and entity
responsibility for the integrity of public issuers’ financial disclosures.
Unlike the PSLRA and SLUSA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act concentrates on
creating structural remedies for the information asymmetries in initial and
secondary markets, not on managing securities litigation. The SarbanesOxley Act entrusts disclosure and gatekeeper monitoring – not government
or private litigation – with primary responsibility for averting fraud. As
discussed below, in addition to the new disclosure requirements, some of
the most wide-ranging and much-discussed provisions of the Act are those
that impose new monitoring and reporting responsibilities on companies’
139

Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 107-205, 107th Cong. 2d Sess.
2 (2002).
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executives and directors and on their outside accounting and legal
experts.140
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act responded to revelations of fraud by
imposing additional disclosure requirements on public companies.

In

particular, the new obligations were designed to heighten transparency with
respect to executive compensation and off-balance sheet arrangements.141
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also required the SEC to adopt rules regarding
disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions in quarterly and annual reports,

140

For an analysis of the role of corporate gatekeepers and the use of expertise generally,
see Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735 (2004). Prior to the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Frank Partnoy had argued that investment banking, accounting and
law firms can play a key role as gatekeepers, and proposed a modified strict liability regime
to enhance their effectiveness in that role. Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?:
A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 491 (2001).
141
In support of increased financial disclosure, former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden
testified before the Senate committee that:
Some of Enron’s financing vehicles appear to have been structured to let
the company report income that had never occurred, and that might never
occur, while essentially arming a neutron bomb in its financial structure.
That this was not clearly disclosed, and that nearly 50% of Enron’s assets
could have been held off balance sheet, demonstrates that both GAAP
and SEC disclosure standards need an expedited review and some fast co
rrective action to increase transparency. The SEC and FASB should work
together to structure an appropriate combination of policies, with
more on balance sheet treatment and vastly more disclosure.
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, Oversight Hearing on
Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies
(Feb. 12, 2002) (prepared statement of Richard C. Breeden, former Chairman of the
Securities & Exchange Commission). In interpreting the new requirements, the SEC
broadened the scope of the material companies should consider and discuss in detail in the
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) portion of public companies’ required
Forms 10-K and 10-Q disclosures. The Commission focused in particular on discussion of
liquidity and capital resources, trading activities that induce non-exchange traded contracts,
and the effects of transactions with related parties. See David S. Ruder, Yuji Sun, & Arek
Sycz, The Securities & Exchange Commission’s Pre- and Post-Enron Responses to
Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis & Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1103,
1124 (2005).
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in order to prevent Enron-esque obfuscation of off-balance sheet
transactions through the use of special purpose entities.142
Because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a response to the massive
accounting frauds at companies like Enron and WorldCom, it focused
extensively on improving the accounting oversight of publicly traded
companies. The Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, a private organization charged with registering, inspecting,
investigating, disciplining and setting audit standards for public accounting
firms that provide audit reports for issuers covered by certain of the
securities laws.143 The Act’s other provisions also focused on financial
accounting and sought to ensure the integrity of the auditing process.
Among other things, it prohibited accounting firms from providing certain
delineated nonaudit services to their claims,144 regulated public company
audit committees and reliance on corporate audits,145 and imposed
responsibility for financial reporting on executive officers.146
142

Id. at 1127. In general, “the SEC rules implementing section 401(b) establish
comprehensive and detailed disclosure standards for using non-GAAP financial measures,
while preserving antifraud measures.” Id. at 1137.
143
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra n.__, at 61-62
144
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78jA. The Section is designed to eliminate the
conflicts of interest that arose when accounting firms provided both auditing and consulting
services for their clients.
145
Title III of the Act adds Section 10A(m) to the Exchange Act. It directs that:
The audit committee of each issuer, in its capacity as a committee of the
issuer, shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation,
and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm
employed by that issuer (including resolution of disagreements between
management and the auditor regarding financial reporting) for the
purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or related work, and each
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Acts also placed additional responsibility on
corporate executives. First, it sought to reduce executive fraud and
mismanagement by limiting various opportunities for executives to abuse
compensation mechanisms.147 Second, the Act made executives explicitly
and publicly responsible for the accuracy of financial reports filed with the
SEC. Three separate provisions required certification of the accuracy of
reports filed with the SEC: Sections 302, 404, and 906 (and the rules
promulgated thereunder) use certification requirements to encourage
corporate management to control and evaluate internal disclosure controls
and procedures.148 The SEC’s implementation of the reforms also focused
heavily on disclosure. Pursuant to the Act, the Commission accelerated the
filing deadlines for quarterly and annual reports, expanded the range of

registered public accounting firm shall report directly to the audit
committee. The audit committee is required to be comprised entirely of
independent directors and be authorized to engage independent counsel
and other advisors.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78jA(m)(2).
146
Section 302 requires extensive certifications to be made by the principal executive
officer(s) and the principal financial officer(s) for each quarterly and annual report filed
pursuant to Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 302(a),
15 U.S.C. § 7241(a); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13(a)-14, 13(a)-15 (implementing Section
302). For an analysis of the certification requirements, see Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing
the Dream of William O. Douglas – The Securities & Exchange Commission Takes Charge
of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 101-03 (2005).
147
Key provisions required the CEO and CFO to return any bonus, incentive, equity-based
compensation or profits from the sale of issuers’ securities in the event the issuer was
required to file an accounting restatement due to misconduct, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 304,
15 U.S.C. § 7243; prohibited directors and executives from trading in the issuers’ securities
during any employee fund blackout period, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 306, 15 U.S.C. § 7244;
and banned companies from extending credit (in various forms) to any director or CEO.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 406(k), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k).
148
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 302, 404, 906, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7262, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (Rule 13a-15).
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events that triggers the requirement of filing a current report, mandated
detailed discussions in the MD&A sections, imposed executive certification
requirements, and adopted pro forma disclosure regulations.149
In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposed rigorous rules of
professional responsibility for attorneys.150

In particular, the rules

governing attorneys require them to report evidence of material violations
of securities laws or breaches of fiduciary duty to the chief legal officer or
CEO of the company, and, if the reportee “does not appropriately respond,”
to report the evidence to the audit committee or to the board of directors
directly.151
149

LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra n.__, at 61-63. In addition to the detailed provisions
regarding financial information and material changes in issuers’ prospects, disclosure is
used as the means to encourage improvements in corporate ethics. Section 406 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires issuers to disclose annually whether the company has adopted
a code of ethics for key executive and financial officers. § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264; see
Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market for
Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253 (2005). Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act casts such
obligations in terms of disclosure, some have seen its provisions as an unusual federal
incursion into the substantive law of corporate governance. See Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521
(2005).
150
ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education, Sarbanes-Oxley Revolution in Disclosure
and Corporate Governance: Complying with the New Requirements (2003); Symposium,
The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 613, 617 (2003).
151
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7241. For analysis and discussion of this
provision, see William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance & Ambiguity: Lawyer
Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. REG. 1 (2005) (assessing Section 307
and the Bar’s response); Lawrence Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy
Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003)
(suggesting that many of the Section 307 provisions are redundant of pre-existing legal
obligations). See also Tom D. Snyder, Jr., A Requiem for Client Confidentiality?: An
Examination of Recent Foreign & Domestic Events & Their Impact on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 50 LOY. L. REV. 439, 439 (2004); Larry Cata Becker, The Duty to Monitor:
Emerging Obligations of Outside Lawyers & Auditors to Detect & Report Corporate
Wrongdoing Beyond the Federal Securities Laws, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 919 (2003);
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In yet another provision designed to encourage and protect
revelations of wrongdoing, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act included provisions
designed to protect corporate whistleblowers.152 Just as other provisions
discussed above enlist professional gatekeepers to monitor corporate
behavior, the whistleblower protection provision is designed to enlist
corporate employees in monitoring and disclosing malfeasance.
In sum, the most significant securities legislation since the initial
1933 and 1934 acts relies on auditors, independent directors, attorneys, and
employee whistleblowers to aid regulators in monitoring corporations and
to prevent, detect, and report wrongdoing. With limited exceptions, such as
the extension of the statute of limitations for securities fraud claims,153 and
increased criminal penalties,154 it does not rely on or empower private
litigants or government agencies to police or prosecute malfeasance.155
Instead, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act operates on the presumption that disclosure
itself will deter wrongdoing.

Stuart H. Coleman, Issues Facing Lawyers as Chief Compliance Officers & Gatekeepers,
Practicing Law Institute, PLI Order No. 6369, The Investment Management Institute 2005:
Meeting the Challenge of a New Regulatory Regime (April 2005).
152
18 U.S.C. § 1514A. For a detailed examination of the whistleblower provision, see
Robert G. Vaughn, America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate
Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2005).
153
Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1658, provides that private causes
of action involving claims of fraud, deceit, manipulation or contrivance may be brought
within two years of the discovery of the violation or five years of the violation. Section
804, therefore, legislatively overrides the Supreme Court’s Lampf Pleva 1-year/3-year
statute of limitations for Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims.
154
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §§ 807, 903, 904-06, 1106, 18 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(a), 1348, 1341,
1343, 1350, 29 U.S.C. § 1131.
155
See Ribstein, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, supra, n.__.
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Taken together, the PSLRA, SLUSA and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
reflect a deepened commitment to using disclosure and monitoring as the
primary means to ensure the integrity of the securities markets.

The

PSLRA and SLUSA disarmed plaintiffs and reduced the possibility for
deterrence of fraud through litigation, while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
responded to massive fraud by increasing disclosure requirements and
gatekeepers’ monitoring obligations.

The combined effect of the three

major reform acts is to shift the burden of regulation and deterrence to favor
more heavily ex ante prevention through disclosure while reducing the role
of litigation as a means of ex poste exposure and deterrence.

Given

disclosure’s shortcomings, such extensive reliance can be seen as an act of
faith.
B. Reform Acts in Action: The In re WorldCom Securities Litigation
Just as plaintiffs responded to the PSLRA by relocating securities
actions to state courts, they responded to SLUSA by pleading their claims to
avoid the reform’s procedural constraints. Since SLUSA targeted the form
of the civil action, plaintiffs transformed to avoid it.

Although many

plaintiffs and their counsel have chosen to pursue traditional class actions in
the federal fora required by SLUSA, others have explored alternative
litigation strategies that they believe have the potential to increase their
recovery and provide positions of greater strength for settlement
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The litigation arising from the collapse of WorldCom

illustrates both the stark contrast between these approaches and the dangers
of focusing securities reforms on plaintiffs’ strategies. As the WorldCom
litigation demonstrates, it is the particular choices made by individual
plaintiffs and their counsel, not the fact of litigation per se that can cause
problems of waste, extortion and duplication in securities litigation. The
two strategies employed by major plaintiffs in the WorldCom litigation
reveal how securities litigation can both advance the law of market
regulation and unduly burden defendants and the courts. Those strategies
are analyzed in detail below.
WorldCom, Inc. had emerged from the obscurity of life as Long
Distance Discount Services of Clinton, Mississippi to become one of the
world’s largest telecommunications companies. In the frenzied days of the
telecomm bubble, WorldCom stock traded at a peak of sixty-four dollars,
and was enthusiastically lauded by analysts. In the summer of 2002, as the
aftershock of Enron’s bankruptcy continued to resound, WorldCom topped
the toppled energy giant by filing the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. In
late June, WorldCom announced that it had improperly treated more than
$3.8 billion in violation of generally accepted accounting principles and
would have to restate its publicly reported financial results.

As it

announced ever-greater restatements, the company, its executives, directors
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and those associated with them became the subject of extensive civil
litigation, SEC investigation, Department of Justice prosecution, state and
industry enforcement action and public castigation.156 While the full scope
of the WorldCom collapse and subsequent legal action is worthy of its own
exegesis, elucidating the effects of the federal securities reform acts requires
a more narrow focus on the civil litigation.
The civil actions arising from WorldCom’s collapse offer a unique
opportunity to examine plaintiffs’ role in securities litigation.157 The two
largest pension funds in the United States both filed civil suits, but pursued
very different strategies: the two approaches illuminate both the successes
and failures of the nineties reform acts, and the dangers and issues in
securities litigation reform more generally. The routes chosen by the New
York State Civil Retirement Fund and the California Public Employees
Retirement System are considered below.
The New York State Civil Retirement Fund (“NYSCRF”), the
second-largest pension fund in the country, was one of the largest
institutional investors in WorldCom: It claimed to have lost $300 million in
the company’s collapse. Like numerous other defrauded investors,

156

See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Although the analysis that follows examines two of the most significant approaches to
litigating claims arising from the WorldCom fraud, others also pursued distinctive
strategies. Attorneys in Mississippi, for example, filed numerous actions on behalf of small
groups of individuals alleging state claims, in hopes of avoiding SLUSA’s class action
removal provisions.

157
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including countless pension funds, NYSCRF brought suit soon after the
restatement announcement. As one of the largest institutional investors,
NYSCRF sought appointment as lead counsel pursuant to the PSLRA lead
plaintiff provisions.158 The district court consolidated NYSCRF’s suit and
the many other class actions that had been filed in the Southern District of
New York and granted NYSCRF’s motion for appointment as lead plaintiff
for the consolidated class action. NYSCRF’s counsel were appointed as
lead counsel for the consolidated class. On behalf of the consolidated class
actions (now captioned the In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation)
NYSCRF filed a consolidated amended complaint on behalf of the class in
October of 2002.
The Consolidated Complaint asserted a wide range of claims against
a lengthy list of defendants.159 WorldCom itself, however, was not among
those named. Because WorldCom had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the
automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy laws protected it from
litigation.160 The bankruptcy stay did not protect the numerous others
implicated in the company’s collapse, however. The Lead Plaintiff’s class
action complaint pleaded extensive allegations against former WorldCom

158

See supra at ____.
The corrected, amended consolidated complaint filed after disposition of the motions to
dismiss and to certify the class can be found as In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02
Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2003 WL 23671651 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2003).
160
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
159
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executives,161 underwriters of WorldCom’s two major bond offerings,
directors and former directors, accountants,162 and those responsible for
issuing financial analyst reports regarding the company.163 The complaint
alleged that the defendants had violated Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the 1933
Act, which provide liability in connection with material misstatements in
registration statements and prospectuses filed in connection with an initial
offering for control person liability in connection with these underlying
violations;164 and that they had violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the

161

The complaint named four of WorldCom’s former executives as defendants: Bernard J.
Ebbers, the President, CEO and a director; Scott D. Sullivan, the Chief Financial Officer
and a director; David F. Myers, the Controller and Senior Vice President; Buford Yates, Jr.,
the Director of General Accounting. Before the class complaint was filed, Yates and
Myers had pleaded guilty to securities fraud and conspiracy, and Myers had pleaded guilty
to filing false documents with the SEC. On [date] Sullivan pleaded guilty to [charges]; he
then testified against Ebbers, who was convicted of [charges]. Both men have been
sentenced to federal prison terms, Ebbers for a twenty-five year sentence.
162
Arthur Andersen LLP, Andersen UK, Andersen Worldwide SC, and two Andersen
partners. Arthur Andersen LLP had also been Enron’s accountant and auditor.
163
The complaint included claims against Salomon Smith Barney in its role as an
underwriter for the bond offerings, and against it and its parent Citigroup and analyst Jack
Grubman in connection with Grubman’s analyst reports. The complaint alleged Section
10(b) fraud claims against Grubman and Salomon and control person claims against
Salomon and Citigroup. The plaintiffs alleged that in a quid pro quo relationship, the
defendants issued unduly favorable analyst reports, provide WorldCom executives with
valuable IPO shares and loan Ebbers hundreds of millions of dollars in exchange for
receiving extensive investment banking business from the company. In re WorldCom, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 400-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
164
Section 11 provides that any signer, director of the issuer, preparing or certifying
accountant, or underwriter may be liable if “any part of the registration statement . ..
contained an untrue statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading . . . .” 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a). Purchasers have standing to sue pursuant to Section 11 whether they
bought the securities at the initial offering or in the aftermarket. Those who purchase more
than twelve months after the issuance of the statement do not need to prove reliance in
order to recover. Id. Section 11 also provides an affirmative defense. If defendants can
prove that the security’s loss in value is due to something other than the alleged
misrepresentation or omission on which the claim is based, defendants need not pay
damages. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). Section 12(a)(2) allows a purchaser of a security to bring a
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1934 Act, which create the private cause of action for securities fraud and
liability for those who “control” those who committed the underlying
fraud.165 In sum, the plaintiffs brought both securities fraud claims and
strict liability and negligence claims against a wide spectrum of those they
believed responsible for the fraud and their resulting losses.
The California Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”),
by contrast, pursued an individual action. It did not join in the class action,
much less seek appointment as lead counsel.166

Instead, it filed an

individual, narrowly tailored complaint in California state court.

Like

NYSCRF, it named former WorldCom executives, directors and former

claim against a seller who “offers or sells a security . . . by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. §
77l(a)(2). Section 12 does not require a showing of scienter: a seller may be liable without
“proof of either fraud or reliance.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 582 (1995).
Like Section 11, Section 12 contains an affirmative defense. Section 15 provides that
“every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, . .. controls any
person liable” under Sections 11 or 12 shall be liable. 15 U.S.C. § 77o. Sections 11 and
12, and Section 15 which derives from them, provided the bases for claims against a
limited array of potential defendants, for more limited damages than those available under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. They are in effect, however, strict liability and negligence
provisions in which proof is relatively easy to establish and the defendants bear heavy
burdens to rebut.
165
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are discussed supra at __. As discussed above, Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 provide more extensive liability than the 1933 Act provisions, but are
more difficult for plaintiffs to establish. Section 20(a) provides that “every person who,
directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter . . .
shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person . . . unless the controlling person acted in good faith . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). As
its text indicates, Section 20(a) broadens the range of defendants who may be liable for
damages for the underlying fraud.
166
See 293 B.R. at 315 (discussing CalPERS complaint).
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directors, and many of the same underwriter defendants.167 Its allegations
were much more limited, however. Instead of bringing fraud, negligence
and strict liability claims, CalPERS pleaded a single cause of action – a
Section 11 claim based on one of WorldCom’s two major bond offerings.
CalPERS’s strategy was straightforward: It limited its claims in
order to remain in state court. If it had pleaded securities fraud claims
pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, its action would have had to be
removed to federal court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over those
claims. If it had pleaded class, rather than individual, claims, it would have
been removable pursuant to the class action removal provision of SLUSA.
Aside from the home court advantage of maintaining its action in California
state court, it may not be immediately apparent why CalPERS pursued such
a narrow suit in a case involving such massive losses and near-certain fraud.
In fact, the true advantage to CalPERS’s strategy was not to be unique, but
to be nearly identical to other actions.
CalPERS strategy was designed to succeed as part of a larger
conglomerate of purportedly individual actions. CalPERs’ attorneys, from
the San Diego office of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP,168

167

In re WorldCom Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437 & 437 nn.10-11 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (describing a similar complaint filed in a Milberg Weiss Action on behalf of pension
funds from Alaska).
168
According to some, the WorldCom litigation was in part to blame for Milberg Weiss’s
final decision to split into two firms – and East and West Coast branches. See Timothy L.
O’Brien, Behind the Breakup of the Kings of Tort, NY TIMES, JULY 11, 2003, at 31. In
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represented approximately one hundred and twenty other public and private
pension funds.169 Milberg Weiss persuaded their numerous pension fund
clients to pursue individual action in each of their home state courts. In a
letter to clients and potential clients, it described its goal as being “to
assemble a coalition of public and private pension funds with $2 to $3
billion in losses and to pursue coordinated litigation throughout the United
States apart from whatever happens in the class action.”170 On behalf of
these “independent” but like-minded plaintiffs, Milberg Weiss crafted a
narrow complaint that it filed in each action in state courts across the
country, with only minor changes to accommodate the factual
circumstances of each action.171
By filing individual yet coordinated actions, the pension funds
represented by Milberg Weiss (referred to in the District Court’s opinions
and hereafter as the “Milberg Weiss Actions”) sought to achieve the
benefits of coordinated litigation without the detriments of class action.
Milberg Weiss represented that it would negotiate and litigate on behalf of
all of its individual clients – thus bringing to bear the full force of their joint
claims – while ensuring that they avoided the federal removal and
particular, the May 23 letter to potential plaintiffs (discussed below) was said to have
“infuriated” Melvyn Weiss and to have been the final provocation for the dissolution of his
partnership with William Lerach. Id.
169
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 431, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
170
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22701241, at *4, No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC)
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003).
171
Id.

73

Fighting Fraud on Faith

September 5, 2005

consolidation that would follow had they filed suit as a class.172 Milberg
Weiss represented to potential clients that it would conduct the pension
funds’ actions in a “coordinated cooperative manner” so that all funds
would “share the benefits of our investigatory efforts, discovery and other
information, as well as experts, thus achieving economies of scale.”173 The
District Court found that Milberg Weiss solicited potential clients by urging
that “the advantages of coordinated litigation activity against common
defendants would also include the leverage derived from the value of the
aggregated claims.” 174 The Court also found that the firm had sought to
persuade clients to participate in its conglomerate by representing that
pursuing an individual action would “permit[] the individual fund to retain
control of its own claims and to be in a position to settle or try its claims as
it chooses.”175
The Milberg Weiss Actions sought to maintain this independence
and establish settlement leverage by avoiding federal jurisdiction and the
certain transfer and consolidation that would follow from its exercise.
Indeed, the District Court found that,

172

In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22701241, at *5, n.1, No. 02 Civ. 3288
(DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003).
173
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22701241, at *4, No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC)
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003) (quoting May 23, 2003 letter from Milberg Weiss to prospective
clients).
174
Id. (summarizing letter).
175
Id. (summarizing letter).
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[i]t would appear that Milberg Weiss has chosen a strategy to
file as many cases as possible for its pension fund clients in
different states and to resist removal of those cases to federal
court and their subsequent transfer to a single federal court
by the MDL Panel. It has eschewed the filing of Exchange
Act claims even if such claims would increase a plaintiff's
leverage, since the presence of Exchange Act claims would
provide an independent basis for removal of the cases to
federal court.176
By limiting their claims in this fashion, CalPERS and the other Milberg
Weiss Actions hoped both to avoid the inevitable removal under these
sections and to take advantage of the bar to removal contained in the 1933
Act.177

The individual actions resisted federal jurisdiction in order to

maintain their independence from the consolidated class and individual
actions. As the court observed,
The existence of a plethora of Individual Actions filed in
state courts appears to be driven at least in part by the desire
of counsel to escape the consolidation or coordination of
their actions with other related WorldCom litigation, a
coordination facilitated by the filing of an action in federal
court and by the MDL process. In an apparent effort to avoid
such coordination, the Individual Actions were filed in state
courts across the nation and were drafted around the removal
and class action provisions of the current federal securities
statutes.178

176

In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22701241, at *5, n.1, No. 02 Civ. 3288
(DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.
3288(DLC), 2003 WL 21219037, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2003).
177
Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act bars removal from state to federal court of claims arising
under that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
178
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 21219037, at *1, No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC),
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2003).
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Despite the carefully planned strategy, the pension funds’ actions were
removed to federal court as “related to” the WorldCom bankruptcy.
Pursuant to the order of the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation
(“MDL”), they were then transferred to the Southern District of New York
for joint pre-trial treatment with the other WorldCom-related securities
actions.179

Upon arriving in the Southern District of New York, the

transferred cases were consolidated with the class action by order of the
District Court.180 The Court had found that
[g]iven the prolixity of litigation regarding WorldCom, the
similarity of the claims, and the magnitude of the losses, the
District Court had found that “consolidation of these actions
for pretrial proceedings is necessary to achieve economies
for the parties and the Court and to achieve substantial
justice for the parties.”181

Thus, in the end, due in part to the defendants’ diligent removal and transfer
litigation and the District Court’s consistent emphasis that the litigation
must be efficient and focused on the merits of the claims, the strategy failed.
Milberg Weiss’s tactics in the WorldCom securities litigation are
exemplary of the type of “plaintiffs’ attorney” conduct that so outraged

179

See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). MDL
transfer is authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
180
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 21219037, at *4, No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC),
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2003).
181
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), Order, Dec. 22, 2002.
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Congress when it passed the 1995 and 1998 reform acts.182 As the District
Courts opinions and orders repeatedly found, the claims alleged by
CalPERS and the other Milberg Weiss Actions were precisely the same as
those raised by the class. The court found that the claims raised by the
individual Milberg Weiss Actions “all arise from the same underlying
course of conduct that serves as the basis for the claims addressed to the
May 2000 and May 2001 bond offerings, and indeed, for the claims in the
Securities Litigation addressed to the trading in WorldCom's equity
securities. The complaints in the Individual Actions make this point
emphatically. They do not rely on any issue, such as an accounting
irregularity, not set forth fully in the complaint in the Securities
Litigation.”183 In addition the Section 11 and 12 claims brought by the
Milberg Weiss Actions were among the most straightforward to establish.
Unlike Section 10(b) claims, they required no scienter showing and had a
much lower threshold with respect to causation.

They were indeed

negligence and strict liability claims: claims that, although intensely
litigated, were not uniquely difficult for plaintiffs to pursue. CalPERS and
the plaintiffs in the other Milberg Weiss Actions had purchased securities in
182

Indeed, the district court found that Milberg Weiss had failed to include critical
information in its letters soliciting clients, and that it had failed to adequately advise its
clients regarding key aspects of the litigation. It found that “Milberg Weiss does not
appear to have presented a forthright description of the advantages and disadvantages of
both the individual action and class action options,” and described in detail key failings of
Milberg’s representations. Id. at *7.
183
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 21219037, at *4, No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC),
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2003).
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the same bond offerings, in reliance on the same statements, and with the
same consequences as plaintiffs in the class action: there simply was very
little (if anything) that was unique about the so-called “individual
actions.”184
Instead, the sole benefit to be gained by pursuing separate, state
court claims was leverage in settlement. By pursuing coordinated (but not
class) actions in over twenty-five states, the Milberg Weiss plaintiffs sought
to spread the defendants’ resources thin.185

Although the federal class

action litigation was automatically subject to the discovery stay of the
PSLRA, discovery in the state court actions could proceed. Had discovery
proceeded in all actions, the number of discovery demands and motions

184

See id. This was true of other individual actions as well. As the District Court
explained:
The May 22 Opinion identified several significant case management
considerations, not least of which was the preservation of assets for
distribution to plaintiffs. Equally important was the need to heighten
efficiency and decrease costs while ensuring a full and fair opportunity
for all plaintiffs and defendants to conduct the discovery and motion
practice necessary to their actions and defenses. In this case, such
efficiencies are particularly appropriate since the Individual Actions and
the class action all stem from the same course of conduct and involve
common questions of law and fact. . . .
The reasoning and purpose behind the stay was that each of the
plaintiffs in Individual Actions would be on sufficient notice of the
defendants' answers to their own complaints by referring to the answers
filed to the class action complaint. The similarities between the
individual and class actions are so great as to render separate filings of
answers in each Individual Action unnecessarily duplicative and
wasteful.
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2003 WL 23095478, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2003).
185
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22701241, at *4, No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC)
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003).
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seeking identical information and alleging identical claims would have
multiplied exponentially. Such duplication adds nothing to the adjudication
of the underlying merits of the claims. The spreading of resources and
competing actions do, however, greatly increase the pressure to settle due to
the sheer cost of litigation for defendants and the uncertainty of multiple
actions and potentially inconsistent decisions.
In the WorldCom litigation, such burdens were to some extent
avoided due to WorldCom’s bankruptcy, despite Milberg Weiss’s unceasing
efforts to separate its actions from the quickly moving class litigation. The
bankruptcy laws not only prevent litigation against a bankrupt issuer, but
permit removal to federal court of all actions related to the bankruptcy.186
Defendants successfully argued in the vast majority of the individual
actions that the claims were sufficiently related to WorldCom’s bankruptcy
to fall within the purview of the bankruptcy removal provision.

The

defendants succeeded in removing the cases to federal court, and in keeping
them there.187 As each of the cases was removed to federal court, it fell

186

Section 1334(b) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), provides for federal
jurisdiction over cases having to do with bankruptcy proceedings. It states that “the district
courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
Section 1452(a) provides for removal to federal court of cases over which the federal courts
have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a).
187
The removal and remand issues were extensively litigated. See, e.g., In re WorldCom,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2003 WL 22533398 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.7, 2003)
(motion for interlocutory appeal); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288
(DLC), 2003 WL 22383090 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2003) (unanimity and removal); In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2003 WL 22299350 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
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within the MDL transfer order and was sent to the Southern District of New
York to be handled with the class action.188
What are the lessons of WorldCom?

First, plaintiffs (and their

lawyers) are not indistinguishable. They pursue different strategies, for
their own purposes, with varying degrees of success.189 Second, Congress
was correct to believe that plaintiffs’ litigation is sometimes designed solely
for unfair strategic advantage – employing tactics designed to expand the
scope of their clients’ recovery due not to an expansive view of the merits,
but solely to unwarranted stretching of defendants’s resources and the
resulting “edge” gained in settlement negotiations. The Milberg Weiss
Actions starkly demonstrate this: they added nothing to the determination of

7, 2003) (Rule 41(a) clarification); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 03 Civ. 1283, 03
Civ. 3860, 03 Civ. 2839, 03 Civ. 4499, 03 Civ. 3859, 03 Civ. 4500 (DLC), 2003 WL
21702284 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 23, 2003) (remand); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 02
Civ. 3288, 03 Civ. 3593, 03 Civ. 3597, 03 Civ. 2840, 03 Civ. 3594, 03 Civ. 3298, 03 Civ.
3591, 03 Civ. 3595, 03 Civ. 3599 (DLC), 2003 WL 21705229 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 23, 2003)
(remand); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 B.R. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (remand &
bankruptcy reorganization); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 02 Civ. 3288, 03 Civ.
167, 03 Civ. 338, 03 Civ. 998 (DLC), 2003 WL 21031974 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2003)
(remand); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2003 WL 1563412
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2003) (severance); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 02 Civ.
3288, 02 Civ. 8981(DLC), 293 B.R. 308, 2003 WL 716243 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2003)
(remand); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 02 Civ. 3288, 02 Civ. 8981, 02 Civ. 9520
(DLC), 2002 WL 31867720 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2002) (individual actions); In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2002 WL 31729501 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec.5, 2002) (stays).
188
See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2003 WL 21219037
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2003). See also In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.
3288(DLC), 2003 WL 21242882 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2003) (consolidation order); In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2003 WL 31867720 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
23, 2002) (addressing consolidation of the individual actions with the class actions); Albert
Fadem Trust v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2002 WL 1880530 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2002) (consolidation of the class actions and appointment of lead plaintiff).
189
Although not related to the WorldCom litigation,
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the merits, but came close to achieving a massive advantage in settlement
solely through their procedural posture. Third, however, litigation can and
does serve a purpose.

There can be no question that executives at

WorldCom engaged in extensive fraud that resulted in massive losses for
millions of investors. While those investors cannot hope to recover in full
the nearly twenty billion dollars they claimed to have lost, the class
litigation was able to achieve some degree of remuneration for them.190 The
class action not only provided some remedy for its constituents, but also
served to expose numerous dubious practices and to force the court,
defendants, and commentators to consider a wide range of important but
rarely scrutinized legal issues.

For example, the litigation raised the

question of analysts’ liability pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5;191
the extent and appropriateness of quid pro quo relationships between
issuers, underwriters and their analysts;192 the competing jurisdictional

190

Several of the Citigroup defendants settled the claims against them with the Lead
Plaintiff in May 2004 for $2.575 billion (the “Citigroup Settlement”). See In re WorldCom,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2004 WL 2591402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2004); see
also Gretchen Morgenson, Citigroup Agrees to a Settlement over WorldCom, NY TIMES,
May 11, 2004, at A1. Numerous underwriter defendants who were all non-lead syndicate
members paid nearly $866 million in settlements. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02
Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2005 WL 613107, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2005); see also Gretchen
Morgenson, Investment Banks to Settle WorldCom Bond Suit, NY TIMES, March 5, 2005, at
C4; Gretchen Morgenson, Bank of America Settles Lawsuit over WorldCom, NY TIMES,
March 4, 2005, at C1. J.P. Morgan, the last to settle, then reached a $2 billion agreement
with the plaintiffs. Gretchen Morgenson, Morgan Accord over WorldCom Costs $2
Billion, NY TIMES , March 17, 2005, at A1.
191
In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d at 424-30.
192
Id.; In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22533398, No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC)
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2003).

81

Fighting Fraud on Faith

September 5, 2005

provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and the Securities Act;193 underwriters
due diligence obligations under the 1933 Act;194 directors’ responsibility
(even before Sarbanes-Oxley) for their certification of documents;195 the
availability of directors’ personal assets for settlement;196 and the statute of
limitations bars to individual actions when a class action is pending,197
among other things.

Many of these issues had not been considered

extensively by courts or commentators,198 and many have implications that
will range far beyond the WorldCom litigation. The fact that the class
actions were consolidated, coordinated and held to an intense and
extraordinarily fast-paced litigation schedule forced focus on the merits of
the litigation and revealed the unanticipated consequences of the evolution
of the securities laws.
III. A Skeptical Approach to Securities Regulation
As the previous Parts demonstrate, markets are messier than the law
describes. Behavioral economics, cultural theory, and recent history remind
us of a few key realities: First, as a practical and theoretical matter, markets
cannot and do not exist independently of the individuals and entities that
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comprise them: They are and must be susceptible to the all-too-human traits
of inconsistency, unpredictability, irrationality, logic, loyalty, and betrayal.
Second, they are vulnerable to fraud. Because information asymmetries
must always exist between those who have initial responsibility for
gathering, processing, and presenting a company’s financial information
and those who use that information to make investment decisions, a gap in
knowledge and control will always create an opportunity for malfeasance.
And, because the information will be used by less-than-rational investors in
incompletely efficient markets, disclosure is an imperfect tool for
preventing and detecting fraud.

Although disclosure does much to

minimize the size and duration of the disparity in information and
consequent opportunity for malfeasance, contemporary economics reveals
that it rests on questionable assumptions.199

Fourth and finally, recent

legislative reforms addressing serious questions about the adequacy of
federal market regulation have failed to take these realities into adequate
consideration.
This Article does not contend that the disclosure model is
undesirable or that it should be abolished. Despite mounting challenges to
the economic assumptions underlying the disclosure framework, disclosure
continues to provide a crucial foundation for American securities markets.
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It provides the surest way of narrowing the asymmetries in information that
create opportunities for malfeasance and the means most likely to push
markets toward greater openness and efficiency. This Article does argue,
however, that disclosure should not function as the sole tool of securities
regulators and disclosure regulations should be based on accurate
assessments of its limitations as well as it advantages. Disclosure alone is
not sufficient to prevent fraud, to punish those who commit it, to
remunerate those who suffer from it, and to clarify the law that addresses
each of those issues. Faith in a disclosure system regardless of extensive
evidence that its assumptions are flawed and despite the difficulty of
predicting or measuring its effects is indeed faith in a “mystical notion.”200
This Part proposes an attitudinal shift and suggests particular
reforms that such a shift might inspire. It suggests that securities regulation
should embrace the complexity and uncertainty of markets and
acknowledge the impossibility of designing legislation that will perfectly
police malfeasance. It draws on Montaigne’s philosophical skepticism to
provide a conceptual basis for supplementing the disclosure regime and
addressing some of its significant shortcomings in order to create a
regulatory regime that better deters, detects, and punishes fraud.
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A. Skepticism
The skeptical philosophic tradition201 advises that “to determine the
limits of our powers and to know and judge the difficulty of anything
whatsoever constitutes great, even the highest knowledge . . . .”202 At the
same time, skepticism doubts whether man is capable of such
determinations.203 As Michel de Montaigne elucidates in his seminal essay,
An Apology for Raymond Sebond,204 the Pyrrhonian skeptics aimed to
“shake all convictions, to hold nothing as certain, to vouch for nothing” and
thus to “make their faculty of judgment so unbending and upright that it
registers everything but bestows its assent on nothing.”205 The refusal to
bestow assent is not a dissolution into “unbelief” or “universal doubting,”
however, but is a means to embrace the habits of “consideration, of selfcontaining,” and of rejection of extremes.206

Writing on Montaigne,

Emerson explains that the skeptic is not the ingénue of caricature, who
“doubts even that he doubts,” but “the considerer, the prudent, taking in
201

The skeptical philosophy discussed here is in the Pyrrhonian tradition. Although
Cartesian skepticism has been the focus of much discussion, that vein is characterized by
its criticism of skepticism more than its embrace (even Descarte attacked skepticism).
Pyrrhonian skepticism, as found in the works of Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne, David
Hume, and Ludwig Wittengstein, has been described as “the only actual skeptical tradition”
after ancient times, and is the tradition of skepticism referred to here. This Part will focus
on skepticism as it appears in Montaigne’s work and Emerson’s exegesis of it. For recent
work on Pyrrhonian skepticism generally, see PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM (Walter SinnotArmstrong ed., 2004).
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sail, counting stock, husbanding his means . . . . .”207 The skeptic “know[s]
that human strength is not in extremes, but in avoiding extremes.”208
Rejecting excesses, he “labors to plant his feet, to be the beam of the
balance . . . . he stands for the intellectual faculties, a cool head, and
whatever serves to keep it cool.”209

For Emerson, skepticism in the

Pyhrronian tradition rejects certainty in favor not of ignorance or blind
doubt, but to create space for reflection and adaptation. He celebrates
Montaigne as the embodiment of this engaged detachment – as someone
who was a thinker of “golden averages, volitant stabilities, compensated or
periodic errors, houses founded on the sea.”210
By describing the skeptic in terms of paired opposites – volitant
stabilities, compensated errors – Emerson captures the paradoxical nature of
skepticism.

The skeptic simultaneously operates within the existing

paradigm and questions its premises – he lives in a house not near the sea,
but “founded on” it.

Emerson’s imagery reveals the true nature of

Montaigne’s skepticism – he does not reject the possibility of knowledge,
but is able to question even the most apparently stable of beliefs without
losing his grounding. Emerson locates the skeptic as someone both within
and without a given tradition by identifying his place as being in the
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“vestibule of the temple.”211 Skepticism is not heresy – the skeptic does not
forsake the temple, nor does he proclaim unorthodoxies. Instead, he enters
only partway; he is there, but not committed. Thus skepticism “is the
attitude assumed by the student in relation to the particulars which society
adores, but which he sees to be reverend only in their tendency and
spirit.”212 The skeptic venerates the principle, even as he questions it.
Montaigne, like Emerson after him, finds that skepticism is not a
rejection of faith, but the philosophy that makes faith possible.

For

Montaigne, the true heretic is one who “dares to presume that he knows
anything.”213 To be “convinced of certainty,” for Montaigne, “is certain
evidence of madness and of extreme unsureness.”214

The skeptical

tradition, on the other hand, rejects the follies and limitations of human
judgment and prevents them from serving as bases for certainty, thus
clearing the path for true faith.

Describing Pyrrhonian skepticism,

Montaigne concludes
No system discovered by Man has greater usefulness nor a
greater appearance of truth which shows us Man naked,
empty, aware of his natural weakness, fit to accept outside
help from on high: Man stripped of all human learning and
so all the more able to lodge the divine within him,
annihilating his intellect to make room for faith.215
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Only by acknowledging his lack of certainty can man find faith. And when
he does, he is able to truly embrace faith as such – as an act of trust without
reason.
The skeptical philosophy elucidated by Montaigne and Emerson
provides both a theoretical model and an illuminating metaphor for future
securities reform legislation.

Their work can provide the basis for a

conceptual framework that permits continued adherence to a disclosure
model while encouraging acceptance of its shortcomings and inducing more
creative approaches to deterring malfeasance. Like Emerson’s “student in
the vestibule of the temple,” the skeptical approach proposed here does not
reject the reigning faith: Disclosure is likely the best means of balancing the
interests of investors and issuers, and of ensuring fair and functional
markets.

While it accepts the notion that disclosure may be the most

advantageous premise for federal securities regulation, the skeptical
approach recognizes and seeks to address its imperfections. What then,
would a skeptical argument about securities regulation look like? Does a
shift in the theoretical framework provide any practical advantage in terms
of debating and drafting legislation?
B. Skeptical Securities Regulation
First, the skepticism advocated here, properly understood, can
provide a principled basis for assessing proposed regulations. It need not do
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so explicitly (that is, for the approach to be effective, no one need stand on
the Senate floor and declare herself a Pyhrronian or quote Montaigne), but it
can work by requiring arguments and laws to be structured according to a
more appropriate framework.

A skeptical assessment begins with

questioning – with doubt about even the most commonplace of beliefs.
Thus a skeptical approach to securities regulation might begin by
questioning how markets function. It might ask whether they are efficient,
and if so, how and in what ways? It might query how investors make
decisions. Are they logical? Emotional? Consistent? Predictable? Do they
use information?

If so, what information and how?

The information

required by law to be disclosed? Or other types of information and means
of accessing it? Adopting a skeptical approach is a way of returning to first
principles, and thus creating a space to consider evolving understandings of
market functioning.

Ironically, a more philosophical approach would

require consideration of more hard evidence and concrete detail regarding
market behavior. Skepticism makes room for economics: By questioning
legal certainties and presumptions, a skeptical approach to legislation forces
the law to take the discoveries of other disciplines into account.
A skeptical approach thus might avert the continued reliance on
controverted theoretical assumptions evidenced in the legislative reasoning
of the PSLRA, SLUSA and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Although Congress
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had the opportunity to consider the most recent work in economics when it
enacted each law, it instead adopted existing assumptions about how
markets, litigants, and malfeasors operate. A skeptical approach encourages
legislators to work within the existing framework, but to doubt and refuse to
act on unproven assumptions.
A skeptical approach would shift not only the methodology of
legislation, but its content. As Emerson recommends, the skeptic seeks to be
the “beam of the balance,” the cool head, or the intellectual. The skeptic
rejects extremes. She resists the temptation to veer too far in any one
direction, but rather seeks a philosophy that fits like “a coat woven of
elastic steel.”216 Again, Emerson’s metaphor captures the adaptive stability
of skepticism. The skeptic is consistent yet flexible, steady yet limber. A
skeptical approach is willing to consider new evidence – of plaintiffs’
abuses or pervasive fraud, for example – and adapt accordingly, but it
resists oscillating dramatically between extreme conflicting positions. The
skeptic recognizes that such shifts might be unjustified on the facts (that is,
that the basic levels or existence of malfeasance or manipulation are likely
to have changed as drastically as claimed), and, as importantly, that they
might be undesirable in and of themselves. In seeking elastic consistency,
the skeptic recognizes that it is not just extremes that are to be avoided, but
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radical or frequent shifts between them. Such an approach would help to
avoid the inconsistency and uncertainty for litigants, courts, and market
participants that arise from too frequent or too drastic changes in
perspective. A skeptical approach would advise against undue antagonism
towards plaintiffs on the one hand, and towards the subjects of regulation on
the other. It would moderate the extreme positions taken toward plaintiffs
by the PSLRA and toward subjects of regulation by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.
Skepticism also would affect the substantive content of securities
regulation by altering how a lawmaker might view her role and approach
the problem of translating new information or new problems into laws.
That is, the lawmaker must ask, what is my role in this process? And, more
specifically, what is the role of the regulation we are trying to design?
In answering these questions, skepticism is uniquely suited not only
to frame how lawmakers might approach new legislation, but also to
describe legislation’s normative aspirations. On a skeptical approach to
securities regulation, the law itself should reflect a skeptical attitude. Like
the skeptic, securities market regulation should also “register[] everything
but bestow[] its assent on nothing.”217 It should take into account the
probability of fraud and other forms of malfeasance, as well as the
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possibility that plaintiffs can and do sue when no fraud has been committed;
it should take into account the possibility that investors are irrational and
unpredictable, as well as the likelihood that thorough dissemination of
material and accurate information can and does play a role in investors’
decisions. Regulation should be designed to provide the framework for
securities markets and to govern behavior within those markets in a manner
most likely to ensure fairness, openness, and efficiency, but it should not
also seek to judge the efficacy of its approach. By aggressively restricting
enforcement – whether by limiting civil litigation or cutting SEC budgets,
or some other method – Congress in effect pre-judges the success of its
regulations. A skeptical approach rejects this conclusion and this role for
Congress. It holds that while disclosure may be desirable and may indeed
satisfy legislative goals, the legislator-as-skeptic is not in a position to
decide.
What is the practical effect of this theoretical approach? It reassigns
responsibility for regulating to Congress and for adjudicating to courts; it
reasserts a role for enforcement litigation. Enforcement – civil or criminal,
private or public – provides an opportunity to gain the knowledge that
Congress lacks. It can determine how rationally or irrationally investors
behaved in a given situation, how useful or irrelevant information was, how
honest or misleading defendants were, how efficiently or inefficiently the
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market functioned. Adjudication is designed to resolve those remaining
doubts, and should be allowed and encouraged to do so. Thus skeptical
legislation would not only focus on creating an unbiased framework, but on
ensuring that enforcement actions can focus on providing a fair and focused
hearing. As discussed with respect to WorldCom, litigation can not only
provide resolution for the parties, but can serve to clarify the law as well.
Enforcement litigation thus further serves the goal of creating a regulatory
regime in which litigants, investors, and market participants have a clear
picture of their rights, risks, and obligations.
Instead of trying to discourage private litigation, reforms should
strive to make it work. By encouraging legislators to reconsider the value
of litigation, skepticism requires thinking practically about how to focus
litigation on the merits of complex securities fraud cases and should
decrease the opportunities for exploitative and meritless procedural
maneuvering. Practical changes that would allow adjudication to achieve
these goals could include, for example, a series of reforms designed to
concentrate and streamline complex securities actions that are filed when
alleged malfeasance affects investors nationwide. Reforms could consider
creating exclusive federal jurisdiction for Securities Act claims (as already
required for Exchange Act claims); simplifying the procedures for, and
expanding the reach of, multi-district transfer, consolidation, and
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coordination; and tailoring federal procedural rules for discovery and
motion practice in consolidated MDL cases. At the same time, reforms that
seek to improve securities litigation and enhance its role in market
monitoring must focus on public, as well as private, actions. For example,
the enforcement office of the SEC and prosecutorial power of the
Department of Justice can be potent tools for uncovering and deterring
fraud, but both must ensure that white-collar crime remains a top priority,
even when it fades from the headlines, and both must receive adequate
funding and support from Congress.
In brief, skeptical responses to securities fraud recognize that it is
impossible to know whether, and how much, securities fraud occurs, how
well disclosure works, or the full extent of malfeasors’ wrongdoing and
investors’ losses, and seek to find out. Litigation can be a powerful tool for
doing so, and an important means for deterring malfeasors and
compensating defrauded investors. Litigation’s strengths – its focus on
concrete facts and claims – also make it an imperfect tool for addressing
some of the problems identified by behavioral economics, however. If
investors truly act irrationally, a claim for securities fraud might not
succeed: an irrational investor might be unable to establish the loss or
transaction causation required to recover.

Although SEC enforcement

actions and Department of Justice criminal prosecutions have principles,
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objectives, tools and standards that do not apply to private plaintiffs, even
they might be unable to bring their full weight to bear in such cases.
Litigation, then, cannot be the only answer.
Like disclosure, litigation has the advantage of limiting its
impositions on the decisions issuers and investors make. If behavioral
economics is correct, however, some imposition might be necessary in
circumstances where it is clear that investors are likely to make irrational
choices that endanger their self-interest.

For example, employees of

WorldCom and Enron were not only permitted, but strongly encouraged, to
invest heavily in their employers’ stock. When those companies collapsed
the employees lost not only their immediate income, but also their
retirement savings. Substantive regulations based on a behavioral critique
and a skeptical approach might recognize the irrationality and danger of
such concentrated investments, and limit the percentage of their pensions
that employees can commit to company stock.

Substantive regulations

might also recognize that merely requiring companies or executives to
disclose conflicts of interest may not prevent such conflicts from tainting
transactions. A skeptical approach would think seriously about identifying
and prohibiting conflicts that are irremediable, with special attention to
analysts, consultants, auditors, and investment banks. The Sarbanes-Oxley
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Act has already taken significant steps in this direction, but it may be time
to evaluate and, if necessary, expand or redirect its efforts.
The reforms outlined here are intended merely as examples of
directions skeptical legislation might pursue.

While they reach an

assortment of issues through a variety of means, they all emerge from the
recognition of disclosure’s limits and of the impossibility of knowing how
markets and individuals will behave. Together, they seek to replace the
orthodoxy of faith in disclosure with the heterodoxy of skepticism.
IV. Conclusion
Despite economists’ widespread recognition of significant flaws in
the its underlying assumptions, the ideology of disclosure continues to serve
as a foundational principle for federal securities regulation. This Article has
shown that misplaced faith in markets drives federal market regulation
toward greater reliance on disclosure and continued hostility to litigation
and substantive regulation; and it has suggested that legislators substitute
skepticism for this unwarranted fidelity.

Like the skeptics, securities

regulation should strive to accommodate uncertainty and to avoid extremes
by seeking to craft a “coat woven of elastic steel” – to enact regulations that
are simultaneously stable and mobile.

A skeptical response would

compensate for disclosure’s limitations and help to achieve the promise of
open and efficient market by using adjudication and substantive regulation
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to prevent, monitor, and compensate for market malfeasance. Then, when a
skeptical lawmaker has faith in disclosure, her faith can be like Montaigne’s
– trust born of recognition of uncertainty, not unwarranted insistence or fear
of change. It is an open-eyed faith; one that acknowledges and responds to
uncertainty with a combination of trust and reasoned reflection. In sum, a
skeptical lawmaker knows that she does not know and begins with basic
questions, then seeks to develop legislation that avoids extremes but
accommodates change, and, finally, leaves the work of assessing the
efficacy of that legislation to the efforts of courts and litigants.
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